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THESIS

THE EVOLUTION OF US ARMY PEACE OPERATIONS

by

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December, 1995

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
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
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


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ABSTRACT

Peace operations have had difficulty in being accepted by the US Army, have not been institutionalized, and continue to challenge the Army as an institution. Insight from the sociological perspective known as social construction was used to examine doctrinal development and institutionalization. Social constructionism predicts that until a new mission is accepted by the individual and the group, it will continue to cause disequilibrium. The constant reconceptualization and changing terminology within peace operations reflected the inability of the Army to accept peace operations as a primary mission. The national security strategy of the US is the primary, the first step in the social construction of peace operations. When peace operations were considered to serve national interests, the Army began to develop appropriate doctrine for these missions. Army professional literature highlighted how the Army leadership conceptualized peace operations and the amount of attention that they believed should be dedicated to the mission. Doctrinal development was traced from post-World War II, demonstrating the inability of the Army to accept peace operations as a primary mission. Until a coherent doctrine for peace operations is developed, these missions will not be accepted and will continue to challenge the Army as an institution.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE EVOLUTION OF US ARMY PEACE OPERATIONS

by

CPT James J. Wolff

Peace operations have had difficulty in being accepted by the US Army, have not been institutionalized, and continue to challenge the Army as an institution. Insight from the sociological perspective known as social construction was used to examine doctrinal developmental and institutionalization. Social constructionism predicts that until a new mission is accepted by the individual and the group, it will continue to cause disequilibrium. The national security strategy of the US is the primary, the first step in the social construction of peace operations. The second step is the development of appropriate doctrine. The third step is an acceptance of the requirement to execute peace operations and the belief that an appropriate doctrine has been developed.

Peace operations have been accepted as a secondary mission, but have not been institutionalized and continue to challenge the Army. This thesis has traced US Army participation in peace operations from the end of World War II to 1994. The national security policies of presidential administrations have been examined to determine the role they have played in doctrinal development. Individual operations were examined to determine the changing role of the military in foreign policy and how each mission was conceptualized. Doctrine was examined to determine the doctrinal evolution of peace operations. The military literature was examined to determine how professional military officers viewed the development of peace operations within the military institution.

The national security strategy of the US during the first epoch evolved from the containment of Communism through collective security, to massive retaliation, to flexible response, and ended with the twin policies of detente and rapprochement. A congruence of objectives between the US and the UN served as a catalyst for US involvement in UN

peace operations, but was limited to the use of MILOBs. The US participated in two essentially unilateral peace operations in the Dominican Republic and Lebanon. The Army's doctrine was expanded to include stability operations, which included missions which are now considered peace operations. A broad definition of peacekeeping within the government and the Army precluded any progress in the construction of the meaning of peace operations.

The national security strategy of the US during the second epoch evolved from the Nixon doctrine, the Carter's focus on diplomacy and human rights, and ended with Reagan's revised strategy of containment through a revitalized military. The Army responded by developing AirLand Battle doctrine and focusing on the Soviet threat to NATO. The UN was ineffective during this epoch because of the increased tensions between the US and USSR. Multilateral operations in Lebanon and the establishment of the MFO reflected the inability of the UN to function. The deployment of a battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division to the MFO and the operations in Lebanon represented a commitment to the use of peace operations to achieve foreign policy objectives. LIC doctrine was developed , which included peacekeeping, but was not institutionalized and was not included in FM 100-5. Within military literature, a few officers recognized the need for doctrinal guidance on the conduct of peace operations. The process of constructing the meaning of peace operations began during this epoch, but was hindered by a lack of guidance by political and military leaders and the development of doctrine.

The national security strategy of the US during the third epoch evolved from an assertive unilateral focus to a multilateral approach which included a renewed faith in the abilities of the UN as the Cold War came to an end. The death of 241 Marines in Lebanon was mitigated politically by President Reagan and the Grenada invasion which took place two days later. The US did not participate in the five new UN peace operations, but the establishment of ONUCA in the American sphere of influence represented the Bush administration's confidence in the capabilities of the UN. The Army began to return to a spectrum of conflict paradigm, but stressed the AirLand Battle doctrine was applicable

to all levels of conflict. Within the military literature, two consecutive Army Chief's of Staff noted that the likelihood of deploying troops to peace operations was growing. The process of constructing the meaning of peace operations continued during this epoch, but was hindered by a lack of political guidance, the rarity of operations, and definitional problems.

The national security strategy of the US during the fourth epoch evolved from multilateralism to assertive multilateralism under the Clinton administration. PDD 25 was the first comprehensive evaluation of the role of peace operations and served as a means to communicate the administration's desire to use the UN to further US national interests. a cooperative atmosphere within the UN led to an expansion in the number and scope of peace operations. The US contributed Army units to five peace operations under UN command or authority. The deaths of soldiers in Somalia temporarily interrupted US participation, but the successful US-led Haiti operation and transition to UNMIH reinforced the US commitment to peace operations.

Doctrine was expanded significantly to include a Joint Publication dedicated to peacekeeping and FM 100-23 *Peace Operations*. A spectrum of war paradigm was included in FM 100-5 and Joint Pub 3-0 *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, the keystone document for joint doctrine. The military literature reflected the need for the development of a comprehensive doctrine to respond to the changes in the international environment. The scope of change was evident in the articles concerning training for peace operations at the CTCs and the lessons learned from participation in peace operations. However, the Army has not institutionalized peace operations.

The first step in the process of constructing the meaning of peace operations has been met. The political leadership began to stress the importance of peace operations in the latter end of the Reagan administration and reinforced their importance during the Bush administration. The publication of PDD 25 by the Clinton administration clearly articulated the requirement for the military to be prepared to execute peace operations.

Although PDD 25 states that the military's primary mission is to fight and win, the need to conduct peace operations is clearly linked to the national security interests of the US.

The second step in the construction of meaning has begun, but has not yet been met. The initial publications on peace operations represents the beginning of doctrinal development. A comprehensive doctrine is the next step which must be met. Campaign planning for peace operations must consider the unique nature of each peace operation. Political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and religious factors must be taken into consideration. Doctrine must address training, force composition, conflict dynamics, mission structures, and the principles and tenets of peace operations. The Army may need to make the conceptual leap from AirLand Battle and develop a separate doctrine for these operations.

The third step in the construction of meaning has also begun, but has also not been met. The Army leadership has accepted the fact that peace operations will be conducted for the foreseeable future. Although they will always be considered a secondary mission, they do not have to be considered of secondary concern. Peace operations bring many of the risks of actual combat. Many of the frustrations reflected within the military literature is directed at the need for a coherent doctrine. While there is a consensus for the need to execute peace operations, there is also a consensus that appropriate doctrine has not been developed.

Initial steps have been taken in doctrinal development, but the process is not complete. Peacekeeping doctrine has progressed the furthest and is generally accepted by the Army. Support to diplomacy and peace enforcement continue to challenge the Army and there is a consensus that the appropriate conceptual framework has not been developed within current doctrine. Until a coherent doctrine is developed, peace operations will not be accepted by the Army as an institution.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The Army has conducted peace operations since the end of the Revolutionary War. The Indian campaigns, interventions throughout Latin America, the Boxer Rebellion Intervention, and numerous shows of force throughout the world reflect a vast experience in peace operations. The purpose of this thesis is to explain why peace operations have had difficulty in being accepted by the Army, have not been institutionalized, and continue to challenge the Army. It will examine how the Army has thought about peace operations over time and the issues and concerns which have dominated the discourse.

The term peace operations can mean almost anything and has been frequently used to describe the whole range of missions that fall under Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Peace Operations were more rigorously defined in Army doctrine with the June 1993 publication of FM 100-5, *Operations*. However, this terminology is rarely found outside of Army doctrine. Involvement in Somalia has been characterized by the Army, the government, and the press as a peace operation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, nation building, and nation assistance.

This thesis will trace the history of US Army peace operations. The theory of social constructionism will be used to explain the difficulty that the Army has had in institutionalizing peace operations and developing relevant doctrine. The political leadership will be examined to determine their influence on the Army. The development of doctrine and force structures for peace operations will be examined from post-World War II to the present. Issues of *Military Review*, *Parameters*, *Army Digest*, and *Army* provide a basis to examine the views of military officers and relevant civilian authors throughout the history of peace operations.

This thesis will divide peace operations into four "epochs": 1946-1973 (absence of doctrine to stability operations); 1974-1982 (development of AirLand Battle to the

deployment of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)); 1983-1989 (MFO to the end of the Cold War); and 1990 to 1994 (post-Cold war era).

B. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM

Social constructionism is a sociological perspective which emphasizes the role played by meaning and belief in social life. There is a loop between the construction of meaning and behavior, each reinforcing the other. Social constructionism acknowledges that society shapes behavior and “emphasizes that these forces are not separate from human activity but are rather the product of human behavior.”¹ Social constructionism emphasizes a central insight into the basic nature of society, that human beings are actors which are constantly shaped by the environment around them. Human behavior is thus shaped by the meaning and beliefs by which individuals understand a situation.

Meaning refers to a broad complex of “feelings, perceptions, moods, thoughts, ideas, beliefs, values, and morals.”² Meaning is constructed through daily interaction with the community in which an individual lives. “Our ability to navigate our way through the complexities of social life is completely dependent on socially constructed stocks of knowledge. These ‘recipes for living’ are sets of meanings, rules, and paths of action that tell us how to achieve all the mundane activities that make up daily life.”³ These “recipes for living” constitute the ability of individuals to interact with other people and understand the world around them. When meaning becomes taken for granted, independent of the actor, the situation is frequently called an institution.

Institutions allow individuals to act, rather than think about their actions, while they conduct their affairs in social life. When the social world appears to be something other

¹Dana P. Eyre, David R. Segal and Mady W. Segal, “The Social Construction of Peacekeeping” in Peacekeepers and Their Wives, (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 44.

²Ibid., p. 46.

³Ibid., p. 47.

than the product of an individual's actions, it has become an objectification. The process of objectification provides the basic structure within which individuals interact within society. However, the process is continually ongoing as individuals attempt to adapt to changes in their social world. Situations change and meaning is reconstructed to continue to make sense of the social world.

The US government is tasked with formulating national security policy. The US Army, as an organization, is tasked with implementing these policies as dictated by the government. Success or failure to carry out these policies are dependent on how the Army receives, formulates and implements the required doctrinal template and the acceptance of the missions by the organization. In addition, the interpretation of success or failure will be dependent on how society constructs the meaning of each individual mission.

This thesis will argue that peace operations have not been institutionalized within the Army because of the relative rarity of operations and the secondary importance that the organization has placed on these missions. Because of the constant reconceptualization and changing terminology, peace operations have been subjected to continuing turmoil resulting in a lack of social construction. The views of political leaders, the doctrinal development within the Army, and the changing perspectives of authors within the professional Army literature will be used to demonstrate how the Army, as an organization, has gone through the social reconstruction of peace operations.

C. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The impact of the political leadership on the social construction of peace operations will be traced through national security policy. Each president, in conjunction with his advisors, develops a national security policy which outlines the national interests of the United States and contains guidance to the military for accomplishing missions which protect those interests. In addition, Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) are occasionally published which provide insight into how the current administration views a variety of military operations. National security policies and PDDs will be used to demonstrate how the political leadership of the US viewed peace operations. The

relationship between the US and the UN will be examined to determine the role the administration expected the organization to fulfill.

The views of the political leadership are important because they are the first step, the key link to constructing the meaning of peace operations. Their views will shape doctrine and influence how the organization conceptualizes peace operations. If they view these missions as being of little importance, they will be regulated to a second class category which needs little attention. If they view these mission as becoming increasingly important, a conscious decision will be made to ensure that the military is prepared to execute these missions.

D. PEACE OPERATIONS

Individual operations will be examined to discuss how the operation was conceptualized by political and military leaders. All UN peace operations will be discussed briefly to identify the changing role of the UN in peace operations. Peace operations which involved US forces will be examined in more detail to identify the expansion and changes to the missions which the Army was expected to execute. The affects of political leadership and military doctrine on operations will be revealed through this examination.

E. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

At the core of the Army is doctrine.

Doctrine preconditions the advice given to civilian decision makers by the military as well as the military's views of its own capabilities and the nature of the war it is called upon to fight. It serves to determine, if not national policy, then the way in which that policy is implemented.⁴

⁴Cable, Larry, Conflict of Myths, (New York: New York University Press, 1986), p. 279.

Doctrine is developed in several ways. Service schools, TRADOC, regional commands, and professional journals all serve as forums for the development of doctrine. Training serves as a proving ground to evaluate doctrine and to provide feedback through these forums. The ultimate proving ground is the deployment of a force to accomplish national objectives. These deployments provide negative and positive feedback concerning doctrine, which leads to its acceptance or refinement.

FM 100-5, *Operations* is the Army's cornerstone doctrinal manual, referred to by many as the bible on how to fight. This manual provides the definitive statement on the entire "spectrum of conflict." Additional manuals supplement FM 100-5 and provide a more detailed description of the missions that the Army may be called upon to execute. In recent years, Joint Publications have provided the doctrinal guidance on how the services will execute missions in conjunction with each other and with civilian agencies. Doctrinal development is the second step in the construction of meaning.

F. MILITARY LITERATURE

Professional military publications provide the entire Army with a forum for discussing past, current, and future operations as well as discussing the doctrine that guides these operations. This thesis focused on the three mainstays of professional Army publications: *Military Review*, *Army* (formerly *Army Digest*), and *Parameters*, beginning with the year 1946. All articles which discussed any variant of the current categories or definitions contained in FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* were extracted. Military literature will be used to trace the conflicting views and definitions which contributed to a continual social reconstruction of peace operations. An acceptance by Army leaders of the requirement to conduct peace operations and a belief that appropriate doctrine has been developed is the third step in the construction of meaning. Doctrine is irrelevant if the leadership does not understand, believe in, and promote it.

G. PEACE OPERATIONS EPOCHS

The four epochs of peace operations are shaped by the above categories. The first epoch, 1946 - 1973, saw the development of stability operations within Army doctrine. The Cold War had begun and the US pursued national security objectives through the UN, multilaterally and unilaterally. During this epoch the United States participated in ten UN operations and an essentially unilateral operation in the Dominican Republic. Vietnam and the eventual withdrawal of combat forces contributed to doctrinal development.

The second epoch, 1974 - 1982, was characterized by a retrenchment in doctrine. Stability operations were discarded and the development of AirLand Battle doctrine focused the Army on conventional war. During this time period operations within Lebanon resulted in the death of 230 Marines by a suicide bomber, an operation in Grenada was conducted, and a battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division deployed to the Sinai as the core of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).

The third epoch, 1983 - 1989, was characterized by debate within the Army concerning the utility of low-intensity conflict (LIC) doctrine. The Army virtually ignored the continuing rotation of battalions to the MFO. The epoch ended with the announcement by Michael Gorbachev that the Soviet Union was prepared to deploy peacekeepers to assist the United Nations in pursuing world peace.

The fourth epoch, 1990 - 1994, has been characterized by an explosion in the number of peace operations conducted, changing views by the political and military leadership, a flurry of new doctrine, and vigorous debate within the professional literature. The UN established fourteen new peace operations and the United States contributed combat soldiers to five of these operations.

The fourth epoch of peace operations continues today. The social construction of peace operations is incomplete and may never be completed. The Army remains focused on the mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars. Doctrinal change occurs slowly and the Army has discarded war-fighting and non-warfighting innovations throughout its history. Prospects for a fifth generation of peace operations will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

H. SUMMARY

The four chapters that follow will examine the topics discussed above by epoch. The theory of social constructionism will be used to explain how the Army, as an institution, adapted to the changes that the political leadership sought. The national security policy of each administration will be examined to determine the expected role of the military in the conduct of foreign policy. Individual operations will be examined to discuss how the operations were conceptualized. Army and Joint Publications will be used to discuss doctrinal changes. The military literature will be used to highlight the changing definitions of peace operations and the professional opinions concerning those changes. From this systematic examination, prospects for a fifth epoch of peace operations will be discussed.

II. ABSENCE OF DOCTRINE TO STABILITY OPERATIONS: 1945-1973

A. POLITICAL FACTORS

At the end of World War II, the US Armed Forces went through the greatest demobilization in its history. Germany and Japan had been defeated and the UN was viewed by the American polity and public as being the instrument through which the world would settle its differences. The permanent members of the Security Council consisted of the major Allied powers of World War II, a continuance of the relationship developed during the war. All of the Army efforts were centered on the problem of demobilization; the future size of the Army and the long-range security of the US would be considered later. By January 1948, the Army had been reduced from a strength of 8,267,958 to 554,030.⁵ Its primary task was to administer the occupation of defeated Axis powers.

In September 1947, the Rio Treaty marked the beginning of the new US peacetime policy of collective security. Each country which desired to keep their freedom was to help itself towards this end, and then help its neighbor. The US, as the nation with the greatest resources and most able to assist other countries, became the greatest contributor of assistance to other countries. Great Britain's inability to maintain a sufficient level of military force in Greece resulted in the Greek Government requesting assistance from the United States on March 3, 1947. On March 12, 1947, President Truman requested and received authority to provide \$400 million in civilian and military aid to Greece to prevent the spread of communism. This was the beginning of the Truman Doctrine, through which the US would provide aid to further collective security and prevent the spread of communism.

The next milestone was the approval of the Marshall Plan. In June 1947, Secretary of State Marshall proposed that the US provide aid to assist in the return to political stability and world peace. In December, Congress passed an interim foreign aid act which

⁵Donnelly, Charles H., United States Defense Policies Since World War II, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 78.

provided assistance to Austria, China, France, and Italy. This was followed by the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which established the Economic Cooperation Administration to provide assistance to countries fighting communism by helping improve their economic viability.

The US Senate passed a resolution on June 11, 1948, which urged the establishment of regional and collective security arrangements within the framework of the UN to protect the national security of the US. On June 24, the USSR closed all rail traffic into Berlin and by August 4 had imposed a complete blockade. The Berlin Airlift successfully persuaded the USSR to call off the blockade, but the Soviet action convinced the US of the need for a structured policy in Europe. On April 4, 1949, the US signed the North Atlantic Treaty and entered its first peacetime European military alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established to implement the treaty. On October 6, 1949, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act was approved to provide military assistance to countries which were unable to provide for their own military defense from aggression.

The Korean War and the decision to send armed forces into combat marked the beginning of a new policy for the US. The use of overt armed force by the Communists presented a clear challenge to the US, which feared a failure to respond would lead to a series of peripheral conflicts. For the first time in the Cold War, the policy of containing Communism placed US forces into a foreign war in which they were not free to use all of their capabilities. The national strategy of the US became to prevent further Communist expansion on the Free World by means short of total war. On January 7, 1954, President Eisenhower introduced the policy of massive retaliation. In the following months this policy was refined into the dual strategy of massive retaliation and graduated deterrence. The administration sought to use the UN as an additional means of preventing the expansion of Communism.

Massive retaliation was a policy which sought to deter the USSR from initiating general war by maintaining a second strike capability. Graduated deterrence included

collective security, foreign assistance, and a strong military which could respond to limited wars with the minimal force required to achieve victory and keep the conflict from evolving into general war. Collective security and foreign assistance were pursued through the mutual security program. The military portion was called the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which was administered in each country by the senior American diplomatic representative. He was assisted by a country team which was comprised of the Diplomatic Mission, the International Cooperation Administration Mission, and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

On March 28, 1961, President Kennedy listed eight defense principles which would assist in accomplishing national security objectives. Reflecting concern over limited war, Kennedy stated that the "strength and deployment of our forces in combination with those of our allies should be sufficiently powerful and mobile to prevent the steady erosion of the free world through limited wars; and it is that role that should constitute the primary mission of our overseas forces."⁶ The Army responded by strengthening its conventional general purpose forces to give the President a "Flexible Response Strategy," an alternative for dealing with crises.

The Domino Theory demanded a response to the perceived Communist menace growing in South Vietnam. The Johnson administration was convinced that a military solution was possible in Vietnam, buoyed by the success of the operation in the Dominican Republic. The 1968 Tet Offensive and the intense media demand for an end to the war convinced Johnson that after years of effort and thousands of lives, the war was not being won. Johnson declined to run for reelection and Nixon took office believing that he had to achieve a "peace with honor." He believed that the political impact of abandoning South Vietnam would tarnish the US polity, undermining its credibility.

Nixon was convinced that the US lacked the economic or political ability to implement a strategy of flexible response. Drawing on the policies of the Truman administration, the Nixon doctrine was developed. Nixon and Kissinger believed that US

⁶Ibid., p. 9.

vital interests required a balance of power between the USSR, Europe, the US, Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC). By maintaining this balance of power, the USSR could be contained and US vital interests would be protected. The rest of the world was considered to be of peripheral interest and would be assisted through economic and weapons assistance, but not through the use of military force. By providing this assistance, the Nixon administration sought to develop regional powers to maintain regional order.

To maintain the balance of power, the US pursued a policy of detente with the USSR and rapprochement with the PRC. The policy of detente involved an increase in trade with the USSR to create a beneficial economic and political relationship which was to prevent the USSR from threatening that relationship through aggression. The policy of rapprochement was designed to capitalize on the Sino-Soviet split, forcing the USSR to be concerned with a potentially hostile threat to its eastern flank. The signing of SALT I and the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty in 1972 were at the core of detente.

Nixon adopted a nuclear policy of sufficiency, which together with the treaties, precluded an expensive arms race with the USSR. Nixon made it clear that diplomacy, detente and rapprochement would be the centerpiece of his national security policy. Nixon ended the draft and implemented the all-volunteer force in 1972, reinforcing his objective of deemphasizing military force as a US policy. In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act, over a presidential veto, limiting the president's power to commit military forces without congressional approval. The epoch came to a close when the Congress voted to eliminate all combat funds for the US military in Indochina after August 15, 1973.

B. OPERATIONS

UNSCOB

Greece was the first battleground of the Cold War. Great Britain and the USSR exchanged accusations in the United Nations that the other was interfering in the internal affairs of the Greek government. The US proposed a UN investigation to determine the

cause of violent border incidents between Greece and Albania. The UN investigation confirmed that Greek communist guerrillas were receiving support from the Communist governments of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. To preclude a Security Council veto by the USSR, the US proposed the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) in the General Assembly. Its purpose was to assist in establishing "normal diplomatic and good neighbourly relations."⁷ The Committee's mandate was to "observe the compliance by the four governments concerned with the foregoing recommendations [and] be available to assist the four government's concerned in the implementation of such recommendations."⁸

UNSCOB was the first UN action which came as a result of Cold War competition and demonstrated Free World support for the Truman Doctrine. The US provided seven Military Observers (MILOBs) to UNSCOB,⁹ the first participation of the Army in post World War II peace operations. The Army did not have a doctrine or established procedure for the assignment of officers to participate in these missions. At this time, there were no restrictions on which countries could contribute to UN operations.

UNTSO

On June 11, 1948, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established to supervise the truce in Palestine. UNTSO was comprised of military observers from five countries and had a mandate which included: "(1) demarcating armistice lines; (2) mediating differences between the parties; (3) establishing demilitarized zones in accordance with the terms of the General Armistice Agreements; (4) deterring an

⁷Birgisson, Karl Th., "United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans," in Durch, William J., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 79.

⁸Ibid., p. 79.

⁹Higgins, Rosalyn, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, Vol. IV: Europe, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 45.

arms build-up; (5) facilitating the exchange of prisoners; and (6) investigating complaints of violations of the agreement.”¹⁰

The US initially contributed 21 MILOBs, which grew to 125 officers and 125 enlisted personnel by August 1, 1948.¹¹ The US provided three Military Chief of Staffs: LTG William E. Riley (September 1948 - June 1953); COL Byron V. Leary (November 1956 - March 1958); and COL R.W. Richert (July 1960 - December 1960), demonstrating a high level of US commitment to the mission. Although the USSR did not veto the establishment of UNTSO, it did abstain from voting and complained that the whole operation was biased by the high-level of participation of Western powers.

UNMOGIP

On January 24, 1949, the United Nations Military observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was established to oversee a cease-fire between India and Pakistan in the disputed state of Kashmir. The mandate included observation of the cease-fire line, investigation of alleged breaches, adjudication of conflicting claims, and recording the nature and disposition of the forces.¹² The US provided 18 MILOBs to UNMOGIP and COL Siegfried Pl. Coblentz served as the Acting Chief of Military Observers from 1 November 1949 - 27 October 1950.¹³ In February 1954, the US promised military assistance to Pakistan and India requested that the UN expel all US personnel from UNMOGIP. In a compromise agreement, the UN decided to allow the US personnel to serve out their commitment. It was the first instance in which a permanent member of the UN Security Council was requested to cease participation in a UN mission.

¹⁰Ghali, Mona “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: 1948 - Present”, in Durch et al., pp. 90-91.

¹¹Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, VOL I, p. 67.

¹²Birgisson, “United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan,” in Durch et al., p. 277.

¹³Wiseman, Henry, Peacekeeping: Appraisals & Proposals, (New York: Permagon Press, 1983), p. 431.

KOREA

On June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. In a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, the US was designated as the lead nation to enforce a cease-fire and to ensure the return of the North Korean forces north of the 38th parallel. The resolutions passed because the USSR had pulled its representative from the Security Council on January 13, 1950, in protest of the National Chinese representative being seated on the Security Council. The US appointed General MacArthur as the UN Commander and all countries contributing military forces were asked to place them under his command. It was the first time that the UN conducted an enforcement action.

UNEF I

On November 12, 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) was established to observe the cease-fire and withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory following the 1956 Suez Crisis. This was the first armed UN peacekeeping operation which served as a precedent for future UN operations. The mandate for the operation, which was passed in the General Assembly, directly forbade the use of troops from the permanent members of the Security Council. The only role that the US played in the mission was the airlift of men and matériel. Diplomatically, the US worked through multiple channels to defuse the crisis and to ensure that the General Assembly would approve the mission.

UNOGIL

On May 13, 1958, President Chammoun of Lebanon inquired whether the US would intervene militarily if he requested assistance to stabilize the deteriorating conditions in his country. President Eisenhower responded that he would intervene to support the current, legal government and to protect American lives and property, but only if one other Arab state agreed to a US presence. On May 22, Lebanon brought allegations of UAR intervening in their internal affairs. On June 11, after the Arab League failed to devise a plan to settle the problem, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established to ensure there was no further illegal infiltration of personnel or matériel.

across Lebanese borders. The force consisted entirely of MILOBs and the permanent members of the Security Council were not allowed to contribute personnel to the mission.

BLUE BAT

On July 14, the pro-Western government of King Faisal of Iraq was overthrown in a violent coup. President Charmoun immediately requested US assistance. The US declared that they were acting under Article 51 of the UN Charter - helping a legitimate government, at its own request, to defend its country against external aggression - and a Marine force landed the next day. This force was followed by an airborne battlegroup from the 187th Infantry Regiment in Germany and other supporting troops. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge told the Security Council that US troops would cooperate with UNOGIL and that they would be withdrawn as soon as the UN could take over the operation. On July 17, the US proposed that UNOGIL be transformed into an armed peacekeeping force, which the USSR vetoed. A resolution to expand the size of UNOGIL passed a few days later.

During the next three weeks, General Chehab was elected to the presidency of Lebanon and the new government of Iraq was recognized by the US. The US then sent a letter to the President of the Assembly agreeing to withdraw its forces if the General Assembly determined their presence to be "unnecessary for the maintenance of international peace and security."¹⁴ The General Assembly passed the resolution unanimously and the US forces were withdrawn on October 31. The US operation, in conjunction with UNOGIL, resulted in a relatively stable environment for the next 25 years.

ONUC

In January 1960, Belgium agreed to grant the Congo independence through a six month transition in which Belgian nationals would assist the transition to full autonomy. On July 5, garrisons closest to the capital revolted and violence spread throughout the entire country. On July 10, the Congolese requested US assistance to help restore internal

¹⁴Ghali, "United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon: 1958," in Durch, et al., p. 169.

order. The US referred the Congolese to the UN, and on the 13th they cabled the UN requesting assistance and stating that only neutral-country military personnel were acceptable. On the 14th, they asked for the Soviet Union to render assistance and Premier Khrushchev expressed his willingness to comply. On 15 July, the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) was initiated to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the government in the maintenance of law and order, and to provide technical assistance.¹⁵ As a civil war spread through the country, the UN expanded the scope of its mandate. The mandate was modified and called for the force to maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo, prevent the occurrence of civil war, and to secure the removal of all foreign forces not under the control of the UN. The force was increased to over 20,000 troops and civilians. The US provided airlift and sealift to the UN force, as well as supplies and equipment.

UNTEA

On October 3, 1962, the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) was established to supervise the transition of western New Guinea from Dutch colonial rule to Indonesian administration. The mandate called for the force to maintain peace and security in the territory during the transition. UNTEA was paid for by the Dutch and Indonesian governments as part of a brokered settlement by the US. The force was primarily Pakistani, with the US providing supporting aircraft and crews. The mission ended on April, 30, 1963, with the transfer of administration to Indonesia.

UNYOM

On July 4, 1963, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was established to observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. The disengagement agreement was brokered by the US, but lack of support to the mission by the US and the UN led to a complete withdrawal on September 4, 1964. The civil war continued for another six years

¹⁵Wiseman, p. 437.

and was finally ended when the local parties concluded a compromise settlement between themselves.

UNFICYP

On August 16, 1960, an independent Republic of Cyprus was established as part of a negotiated settlement between Britain, Greece, and Turkey. On December 21, 1963, fighting broke out between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. On December 24, Britain, Greece, and Turkey offered to provide a peacekeeping contingent and the government of Cyprus accepted the offer. Sporadic violence continued throughout the country and in January 1964, Britain suggested that a NATO force be sent to the island with US participation to prevent an intra-NATO conflict between Greece and Turkey. The US accepted the idea, but the Cyprus government rejected the plan. On March 27, 1964, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established to prevent further escalation and restore normal conditions. The US supported the operation financially and provided airlift to UNFICYP.

POWER PACK

On May 30, 1961, Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, was assassinated. Joaquin Balaguer assumed the presidency and the riots erupted across the country in protest against the possibility of a continuation of the dictatorship. After a show of force by a US naval task force, the Balaguer government established a council of state to govern until elections. On December 20, 1962, Juan D. Bosch was elected president. On September 25, 1963, he was ousted in a military coup and was deported. The US recognized the new government on December 14, 1963, and Foreign Minister Donald Reid Cabral was named head of the governing civilian junta a week later. On April 24, 1965, supporters of former President Bosch staged a military uprising and the Reid government fell the next day.

As the level of violence rose, the Navy moved a task force towards the Dominican Republic in anticipation of the need to deploy Marines. On April 27, the task force began a limited evacuation of Americans from Santo Domingo. The next day, President Johnson

announced that the US Government had been informed by authorities in the Dominican Republic that they could no longer guarantee the safety of Americans and that US military assistance was needed to safeguard them. President Johnson added that four hundred Marines had already landed.¹⁶

The US notified the UN Security Council of the action and the Organization of American States (OAS) held a meeting to consider the crisis on April 29. On May 1, the OAS announced that it was sending a committee of five to attempt to negotiate a cease-fire and to assist in evacuating foreigners. The OAS also urged the warring factions to establish an international neutral zone of refuge. Acting unilaterally, President Johnson announced that the US forces in the Dominican Republic had the mission of establishing the neutral zone, but that more forces would be required to properly execute the mission. These forces would consist of additional Marines and two battalions from the 82nd Airborne Division.

The following day President Johnson announced that Cuban trained revolutionaries had taken over a democratic revolution. He announced that another 4,500 troops would be deployed to prevent "the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere."¹⁷ On May 6, the OAS passed a resolution creating its first multinational force. The mission of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was defined as "cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions."¹⁸ The resolution assisted in deflecting the criticism in the UN that the US had acted unilaterally in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation.

¹⁶Donnelly, United States Defense Policies in 1965, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1966), p. 80.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁸Palmer, Bruce, Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965, (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 1989), p.71.

The US force, which reached a peak strength of 22,500 on May 10, was responsible for manning the International Security Zone (ISZ). On May 24, the first patrols by the IAPF began and the US began drawing down its troop commitment by redeploying the Marine forces. On June 6, the last Marines departed and the US commitment was down to around 12,000, with about 1,800 Latin American troops.¹⁹ The IAPF supported the provisional government and engaged any element which attempted to disrupt the electoral process. The ISZ allowed the IAPF to adopt a neutral position by forcing a separation of the Loyalist and Constitutionalist factions. While a political compromise was being worked out, the IAPF provided humanitarian assistance to Dominican civilians.

On August 31, the OAS brokered *Act of Reconciliation and Institutional Act* established an interim government under Hector Garcia-Godoy pending elections to be held in June 1966. The IAPF now shifted their emphasis from neutrality to active support of the provisional government. The IAPF prevented an attempted coup and was used to stop outbreaks of violence throughout the country. In June 1966, the IAPF was used to monitor the elections and Joaquin Balaguer won the presidency. On September 27, 1966, the last American soldiers departed the Dominican Republic. As a result of the US-led operation, the Dominican Republic has remained relatively stable for almost 30 years.

UNIPOM

On September 23, 1965, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) was established to facilitate the cessation of border conflict. The mandate called for the supervision of the cease fire along the India-Pakistan border and the withdrawal of both parties from the border. The mission was a corollary to UNMOGIP and did not affect the disputed areas of Jammu and Kashmir. The US did not contribute to this mission.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 77-78.

UNEF II

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israel. The USSR supported the Arab invasion with diplomatic encouragement and then through the airlift of military supplies. On October 13, Israel offered a cease-fire in place, which was rejected by Egypt. In response to a request by Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, the US immediately began to transport equipment and supplies to Israel to assist in bringing a quick end to the fighting. Jordan entered the war on October 14, but the Arab advance was brought to a halt and Israel began to counterattack.

By October 20, Israel had plunged deep into Arab territory and Saudi King Faisal announced an oil embargo on the US. The USSR and the US brokered a cease-fire resolution and presented it to the Security Council on October 21. When fighting continued, Egypt requested that a joint US-USSR force to compel an Israeli withdrawal. The USSR threatened to intervene unilaterally and the US placed all forces on Defense Condition Three.²⁰ The US conducted diplomatic missions between Egypt and Israel and was able to broker a cease-fire that was acceptable to both sides. On October 25, the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) was established to supervise the cease-fire.

UNEF II exempted the permanent members of the Security Council from contributing troop contingents. A Soviet desire to contribute to the operation resulted in a compromise in which the US and the USSR both contributed thirty-six MOs through UNTSO, which assisted in the establishment of UNEF II.²¹ UNEF II had a mandate "(1) to supervise the implementation of Resolution 340, which called for an immediate and complete cease-fire in positions occupied by the respective forces on October 22, 1973; (2) to prevent the recurrence of the fighting and to cooperate with the International

²⁰Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force II: 1973-1979," in Durch, et al., pp. 134-135.

²¹Finger, Seymour M., "The Maintenance of Peace," in Kay, David A., The Changing United Nations: Options for the United States, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 198.

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian activities; and (3) to operate with the cooperation of UNTSO."²²

C. DOCTRINE

The subjection of military action during war was a new experience for the military. Within Army doctrine, this type of warfare was first called "wars of limited objective".²³

With the publication of the 1954 *Field Service Regulations*, the Army began its evolution towards the concept of a "spectrum of conflict" and the limiting of the application of military power to obtain political objectives. Victory was reevaluated, "Victory alone as an aim of war cannot be justified, since in itself victory does not always assure the realization of national objectives."²⁴

The 1962 *Field Service Regulations* introduced the "Spectrum of War," which defined cold war as "the application of national power short of military force" and general war as "the unrestricted application of military force"; the middle of the spectrum was defined as limited war and "represents the wide range of conflicts between cold war and general war."²⁵ The concept of limited war clearly stated that "military operations must be conducted within the limits established by national policy."²⁶

Chapter 12, "Situations Short of War," is the beginning of the doctrinal development of peace operations. The missions included shows of force, truce enforcement, International Police actions, and legal occupations. The imperative of

²²Ghali, Mona, "United Nations Emergency Force II: 1973-1979," in Durch, et al., p. 137.

²³Department of the Army Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 September 1954), p. 6.

²⁴FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 19 February 1962), p. 7.

²⁵*Ibid*, p. 4.

²⁶*Ibid*, p. 12.

minimal force was clear. "The commander must use the minimum amount of force required to accomplish force objectives and discontinue the use of force when it is no longer required."²⁷ The genesis of the idea that Army personnel could accomplish missions in any environment can be found in the statement, "The sound discipline of combat units is the best possible basis for the special troop training required for operations in situations short of war."²⁸ Additional training was to include orientation on the force mission, local customs, conditions in the area of operations, security procedures, and relationships with the civilian populace. The psychological impact of these operations was recognized and was to be considered in the planning for such operations.

U.S. involvement in Vietnam forced the military to revise doctrine and establish a new type of operation. Stability Operations were defined as "That type of internal defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and *without* which progress cannot be achieved."²⁹ The 1967 *Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations* was primarily focused on the training of Host Country (HC) forces to conduct operations efficiently in the given operational environment. However, it also stated that "U.S. advisory assistance may include providing and controlling U.S. combat support and combat service support for HC forces."³⁰

The next doctrinal revision placed military actions within stability operations firmly under civilian control. "At the HC national level, the U.S. Ambassador or the principle U.S. diplomatic officer is primarily responsible for insuring that all U.S. military,

²⁷Ibid., p. 156.

²⁸Ibid., p. 161.

²⁹FM 31-73 *Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 18 October 1967), p. 4.

³⁰Ibid., p. 32.

economic, social, and political assistance programs in the country are integrated and coordinated.”³¹ The minimal application of combat power was stressed in the conduct of stability operations. Operations which could be considered peace operations included populace and resource control operations (checkpoints, controlling refugees and displaced persons, protecting resource storage areas), frontier operations (deny exfiltration or infiltration of insurgents, refugee control, military civic action), disarming the population (during or after conflict), and protection of voters and polls (to ensure a valid election). Although this manual was designed to battle insurgencies and revolution, it contained trace elements of what would later become peace operations.

The 1970 version of *Military Police Operations in Stability Operations* provided “a specific guide for providing combat support and combat service support to U.S. elements engaged in stability operations and for the organization, training, and employment of military police personnel and units assigned to train and advise host country (HC) civil, military, and paramilitary police.”³² Chapter 3, “Training and Advisory Assistance,” provides guidance on how to train a HC police force and Appendix E, “Police Training Subjects and Scope,” details training subject matters for HC police. These missions were conducted by UN forces in the Congo.

The 1970 version of *Base Defense (Test)* provided guidance on how to establish and operate base defense within stability operations. The parallels to peace operations are clear in the operational environment, which includes US forces as guests in a HC, lack of unity of command between the nations involved in the operation, and the absence of declared war. The difficulty of command and control is highlighted “when there is no control

³¹FM 31-23 *Stability Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 8 December 1967), p. 33.

³²FM 19-50 *Military Police in Stability Operations*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 4 February 1970), p. 1-1.

organization such as the United Nations or a special treaty organization.”³³ This statement represents a link between peace operations and stability operations.

The 1972 version of *Border Security/Anti-Infiltration Operations* provides doctrine “applicable to Army forces involved in border security operations: specifically to cold war conflict, to include stability operations; generally, to limited war.”³⁴ This manual highlights the political factors and states that “commanders must be acutely aware of the political implications and overall sensitivity of their missions.”³⁵ Restrictions would include rules of engagement which would limit the use of force, equipment, and firepower. Special training included police-type patrolling, operation of checkpoints, and observation post techniques. The psychological pressures caused by infrequent contact with the enemy and the need for constant vigilance were noted as a potential problem that leaders would need to consider when planning these operations.

The 1972 revision of *Stability Operations* added a chapter on training requirements for advisors and a paragraph on border operations. The primary mission of stability operations was given to Special Action Forces, with a tiered response from brigade-size backup forces from overseas and then brigade-size forces from US based forces. Additional changes included the removal of population relocation and transfrontier pursuit missions from doctrine. This manual was the last doctrinal guidance prior to the removal of combat soldiers from Vietnam on March 29, 1973.

8. ³³FM 31-81 (Test) Base Defense, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 17 March 1970), p. 2-

³⁴FM 31-55 Border Security/Anti-Infiltration Operations, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 17 March 1972), p. 1-1.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 1-3.

D. MILITARY LITERATURE

The first article of interest was published in 1951 and discussed the role of the Army in Korea from 1945 - 1949.³⁶ Occupation duty in Korea consisted of controlling the demarcation line, processing refugees, and repatriating prisoners of war. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) included avoiding conflicts, withdrawing from hostile fire, and firing only in self-defense. The parallels to peace operations are clear, but are not made by the author.

In 1953 LTC Cilley discussed the role of UN MILOBs and the need to train US officers to accomplish this mission.³⁷ He posited that these mission were consistent with US policy objectives and that officers selected should believe in the UN and possess the personal qualities required to operate in this difficult environment. He concluded that the use of UN MILOBs would continue to grow and that the US should consider training officers to participate prior to their actual assignment.

In 1964, Chief of Staff of the Army Johnson wrote:

Some of these peace-keeping or stability operations amounted to full participation in a limited war, as in Korea. Others included sizeable participation in an advisory role in active warfare, as in Vietnam. Still others involved the occasional sharing of combat tasks by teams of U.S. military advisors and instructors, as in Greece, in the Philippines or in Laos; and a few were accompanied by no fighting at all and involved only the presence of organized military force, as in Lebanon or in Thailand.³⁸

This is the first reference to the Army participating in peace-keeping operations, but the breadth of the operations cited reflects a rather broad definition.

³⁶Gayle, John, "Korea - Honor Without War," *Military Review*, January 1951, pp. 55-62.

³⁷Cilley, George E., "The Role of the United Nations Military Observer," *Military Review*, February 1953, pp. 25-31.

³⁸Johnson, Harold K. "Landpower Mission Unlimited," *Army*, November 1964, p. 41.

In 1965, General Johnson wrote that he believed the Army "would continue to be called on for peacekeeping or stability operations and called the Dominican Republic operation a 'full scale stability operation.'"³⁹ Once again, the definition of peacekeeping was very broad and included the "semi-conventional war" in Vietnam. Peacekeeping included an unlimited range of landpower missions to prevent the expansion of Communism. LTG Palmer wrote about the Dominican Republic operation in the following article, but did not place it within an operational category.⁴⁰ He said the US mission was to establish the ISZ, to provide assistance to civilians, and to establish stable conditions to ensure a democratic regime. He described the forming of the IAPF and the combat missions which they accomplished to ensure stability within the country.

In 1971, Secretary of the Army Froehlke outlined his objectives for the Army as it carried out its "peace mission."⁴¹ He did not provide a definition of what a "peace mission" was. The following year, he stated that his objectives had not changed for the "Army as it carries out its peace-keeping mission."⁴² He stated that peace-keeping "is our one reason for being, our one and only goal."⁴³ He did not provide a definition of peace-keeping in either article.

During this epoch there were eleven other references to peace operations. Nine described UN operations,⁴⁴ one described the need for a Inter-American Peace Force,⁴⁵ and

³⁹Johnson, "Subversion and Insurgency: Search for a Doctrine," *Army*, November 1965, pp. 40-42.

⁴⁰Palmer, Bruce JR. "The Army in the Dominican Republic," *Army*, November 1965, pp. 43-44.

⁴¹Froehlke, Robert F., "The Key Words: Involvement and Teamwork," *Army*, October 1971, pp. 16-18.

⁴²Froehlke, "Peace-keeping With Pride and Integrity," *Army*, October 1972, pp. 16-19.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴⁴See "United Nations Emergency Force," *Military review*, August 1960, p. 72; Adams, T.W., "Crisis in Cyprus", *Army*, September 1964, pp. 26-34; Ramos, Francisco J.,

one described military civic action programs.⁴⁶ None of these articles implicitly discussed doctrinal implications for the Army in peace operations. The successful operations in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic did not receive very much attention and were only loosely linked to a broad concept of peacekeeping.

E. SUMMARY

The first epoch was characterized by the use of the UN by the US to accomplish national security objectives. A congruence of objectives between the US and the UN assisted US foreign policy. The objective of the US was to prevent or contain the spread of Communism through collective security. This included providing economic, political, and military assistance to countries which requested help. The objective of the UN was to prevent or contain conflict to ensure world peace and security. The UN used negotiation, mediation, unarmed observers, armed peacekeepers, and armed forces in an attempt to accomplish its goals. The US could ensure that the UN was a useful tool to accomplish its goals because of its veto in the Security Council and the fact that the majority of countries within the General Assembly supported the US.

The UN established twelve operations during this time period. With the exception of ONUC, the mandates were limited in scope and manpower. Only two of the operations

"The United Nations and the Congo Crisis," *Military Review*, November 1965, pp. 50-57; LTC Corvino, Joseph M., "UN Peace Forces and International Law," *Military review*, October 1966, pp. 8-18; Bunche, Ralph J., "Toward a Secure Peace," *Army Digest*, June 1969, p. 29; Harbottle, Michael N., "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," *Military Review*, September 1969, pp. 43-59; Oliveira, Kleber F., "Can a Peace-keeping Force be a Guest Force?," *Military review*, April 1970, pp. 94-98; Sheikh, Ahmed, "The International Soldier," *Military review*, June 1970, pp. 80-90; and Chopra, Maharaj K., "Peacemaking in the Indochina States," *Military review*, July 1970, pp. 70-76.

⁴⁵Barrett, Raymon J., "Inter-American Peace Force," *Military review*, May 1967, pp. 85-91.

⁴⁶Glick, Edward B., "Military Civic Action: Thorny Art of the Peace Keepers," *Army*, September 1967, pp. 67-70.

(UNYOM, UNIPOM) were conducted without substantial US assistance. UNYOM was possible because of the US brokered agreement which established the conditions for its implementation. The US refrained from providing direct support because of a temporary thaw in relations with the USSR. Assistance to UNIPOM was hindered by the military assistance provided to India. The USSR brokered the cease-fire which made the operation possible. The US participated directly in four operations (UNSCOB, UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNEF II), providing MILOBs. It led the enforcement action in Korea and provided monetary and transport assistance to the other seven operations. The US also conducted operations in the Dominican Republic and Lebanon outside of the auspices of the UN. These were essentially unilateral peace operations conducted under the operational category of stability operations.

American involvement in South East Asia forced the Army to develop doctrine to support the political goal of containment. The development of stability operations provided a coherent doctrine, but the concept was never more than a secondary concern. The war in Vietnam was fought as a conventional war and applications of stability doctrine were never fully supported by the senior military officers directing the action. A doctrinal template was developed, but was not institutionalized. The process of objectification was never completed and the Army continued to conduct operations in Vietnam with conventional doctrine adapted only slightly from World War II. The lessons that should have been learned from the successful operations in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic were ignored in favor of a strategy of annihilation in Vietnam.

Peacekeeping was linked directly to stability operations by Chief of Staff of the Army Johnson. The Army's view of peacekeeping at this time included any operation short of general war which assisted in the attainment of peace on US terms. UN operations were described by various authors, but little thought was given to whether the Army would participate and what form that participation would encompass. The tacit agreement in the UN against permanent Security Council members participating in peacekeeping operations reinforced the belief that the Army would not be called upon to

conduct these operations. The doctrinal trace for peace operations occurred during this epoch, but the process of constructing of the meaning of peace operations did not.

III. AIRLAND BATTLE TO THE MFO: 1974-1982

A. POLITICAL FACTORS

In early 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger promulgated a new doctrine of flexible nuclear options. The aim was "to provide the President with a wider set of much more selective targeting options so as to shore up deterrence across the entire spectrum of risk."⁴⁷ The new doctrine was not a war-winning strategy, but instead sought to influence Soviet intentions and increase US deterrence capability. Later that year, the Vladivostok accords appeared to indicate Soviet acceptance of nuclear parity in a SALT II treaty. In 1975, through the Helsinki accords, the US recognized the USSR occupation of Eastern Europe in exchange for a commitment from the Soviet leadership to respect human rights in the USSR. The Ford administration continued to follow the Nixon doctrine despite the 1975 North Vietnam conquest of South Vietnam and the heavy assistance of Cuban military forces in Angola.

The Carter administration took office convinced that detente should be continued, but refined. He believed that the US had overcome its extreme fear of communism and wanted to construct a viable relationship with the USSR. Believing this was possible, he sought to lead the US in the international arena by making the respect for human rights a pillar of his foreign policy. Economic and arms assistance to the lesser powers declined through this linkage to human rights. The diplomatic aspect of national security policy was emphasized and the military component was focused towards Europe and NATO. The mediating role that Carter played in bringing about the Camp David Accords demonstrated the administrations reliance on diplomacy in the international arena. Carter virtually ignored Soviet-sponsored military actions throughout the world, including the Cuban airlift of troops to Ethiopia in 1977-1978.

⁴⁷Litwak, Robert S., Detente and the Nixon Doctrine, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 168.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a reevaluation of national security policy and the introduction of the Carter doctrine. In an abrupt shift, Carter proclaimed that the US would be willing to use military force in the Persian Gulf if outside powers interfered, withdrew the SALT II treaty from the ratification policy, imposed a grain embargo on the USSR, pushed through a law requiring registration for the draft, and withdrew the US team from the Moscow Olympics. The seizure of hostages in Iran and the failed military rescue attempt contributed to the election of Ronald Reagan.

Reagan took office convinced that years of neglect had negatively affected the military strength of the US. To stop Soviet expansion, a revitalized containment strategy was required. To do this, he concentrated on a defense buildup which focused on modern military equipment. He pushed through the strategic defense initiative (SDI) in an attempt to find a way to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. Although manpower increased only slightly, Reagan emphasized the need for increased strategic deployability through light ground forces and strategic airlift. The administration reversed the Carter policy on economic and arms assistance, believing they would assist other countries in achieving national security objectives and contribute to regional stability. The deadlock in the UN caused by increased Cold War competition convinced Reagan of the necessity for a more unilateral approach to foreign policy.

B. OPERATIONS

UNEF II

On January 18, 1974, Egypt and Israel signed their first disengagement agreement. The US agreed to perform overflights at regular intervals to ensure that both sides were adhering to the agreement. The second disengagement agreement was signed on September 4, 1975, in Geneva and provided for a ground surveillance unit manned by US civilians, the Sinai Field Mission (SFM). The unit operated in the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes, the two main ground routes through the Sinai. After Sadat's historical visit to Israel in November 1977, Carter invited the heads of state to Camp David for bilateral talks. As a result of this effort, the two sides signed a peace treaty in March 1979. Fear

of a Soviet veto precluded the Security Council from renewing UNEF II's mandate and the SFM remained as the only monitoring "force" while the US formed a multilateral peacekeeping force.

UNDOF

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was the second peacekeeping operation in the Middle East following the October War. The US mediated a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, which resulted in Security Council Resolution 350. The force had a mandate "to ensure the observance of the cease-fire; to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement with respect to the absence of military forces in the area of separation and the restriction of arms and personnel in the Syrian and Israeli areas of limitation; and to facilitate the implementation of Resolution 338."⁴⁸ The agreement signed by Israel and Egypt precluded permanent members of the Security Council from participating in the operation.

UNIFIL

After the Lebanese civil war ended in October 1976, the Lebanese government was unable to establish firm control in southern Lebanon. A hodgepodge of nationalist and extremist groups operated in the area, dominated by the PLO. Raids into Israel by the PLO were followed by intensive retaliation by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). On March 11, 1978, the PLO conducted a commando raid which killed 37 and wounded 76 Israelis.⁴⁹ The IDF responded with Operation Litani, an armed incursion into southern Lebanon on March 14-15. On March 19, the US proposed and the UN adopted Security Council Resolution 425, establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL's mandate was to "(1) confirm an immediate and Israeli cease-fire and withdrawal from Lebanese territory; (2) restore international peace and security; and (3)

⁴⁸Ghali, Mona, "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," in Durch, et al., p. 155.

⁴⁹United Nations, The Blue Helmets, (New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), p. 111.

ensure the restoration of Lebanese governmental authority and its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and territorial independence."⁵⁰

UNIFIL encountered many problems from the very beginning of the operation. The factions involved continued to conduct operations against each other and UNIFIL could do little to halt the violence. On June 5, 1982, the Security Council adopted Resolution 508, charging all parties to cease military activities in Lebanon no later than 0600 hours on June 6. Within hours of the mandated cease-fire, Israel invaded Lebanon and moved through the UNIFIL sector. Encouraged by their initial success, the IDF continued its offensive to the outskirts of Beirut, trapping the remnants of the PLO inside the city. On July 16, Saudi Arabia and Syria requested US assistance in arranging a PLO withdrawal from Beirut.

MFO

When the UNEF II mandate expired, Israel made it clear that a joint Israeli-Egyptian or multinational peacekeeping force was required in the Sinai. Egypt rejected the former and asked the US to honor its commitment and establish a multinational force.⁵¹ David Segal was one of the numerous social scientists whose advice was sought in the formation of the MFO. He offered four suggestions, all of which were ignored by the planners. First, he suggested that the US not participate militarily. Second, that a unit be specially formed and trained for duty. Third, that a Military Police battalion be used. And fourth, that an elite unit not be used. Army Chief of Staff General Meyer believed that "the best soldiers would make the best peacekeepers" and decided that the commitment would be rotated between battalions from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).⁵²

⁵⁰Ghali, Mona, "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978-Present," in Durch, et al., p. 187.

⁵¹Tabory, Mala, The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 7.

⁵²Segal, et al., pp. 56-57.

As the US continued to support the Camp David Accords through the SFM and aerial surveillance, the political, administrative and financial structure of the MFO was developed. On December 29, 1981, President Reagan signed Public Law No. 97-132, authorizing US participation in the MFO.⁵³ The MFO began their deployment on March 10, 1982, were in place by March 20, and assumed duty at 1300 hours on April 25, 1982.⁵⁴

The main objective of the MFO is to verify the adherence to the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty signed at Camp David on September 17, 1978. It is a neutral force with a clear mandate covering its mission to observe, detect, and then notify the two countries of any violations concerning the agreed to limit of armed forces in the four zones of the Sinai Peninsula. The soldiers are armed with defensive weapons and act as a deterrent to a resumption of hostilities by their physical presence. In the thirteen years that the force has been in existence, there have been no reports of soldiers cooperating with one state at the expense of the other and no soldier has been killed by shots fired in anger.

MNF I

The Multinational Force (MNF I) was deployed from July-September 1982, consisting of US Marines and troops from France and Italy. The mandate of the force was to ensure the safe removal of the PLO from Lebanon. Each country was in Lebanon through bilateral agreements with the Lebanese government and functioned together through cooperation.⁵⁵ The MNF escorted over 14,000 PLO soldiers to safety by land and sea, and then disbanded on September 10.⁵⁶ Four days later, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated and factional violence resulted in the death of hundreds within the Palestinian

⁵³Tabory, p. 14.

⁵⁴Tabory, p. 15.

⁵⁵Gregory, Frank, "The Multinational Force - Aid or Obstacle to Conflict resolution?", *Conflict Studies* no. 170, 1984, p. 24.

⁵⁶Bolger, Daniel P. Savage Peace, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), pp. 173-74.

refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla. Amin Gemayal, Bashir's brother, was chosen as the new president and he immediately requested assistance from the US and Europe.

MNF II

The second Multinational Force (MNF II) was formed on September 25, 1982 and consisted of the same countries as MNF I. In February 1983, a small British contingent joined the forces. The mandate of the force was "to provide an interposition force at agreed to locations and thereby provide the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area."⁵⁷ The US contingent of Marines numbered over 1,750 and had the mission of protecting the international airport. The MNF II did not have a multinational force commander and relied on cooperation as a method of command and control. The force was not considered to be a peacekeeping force by the administration or the military, but was viewed as having a mission of "presence."⁵⁸

The MNF II initially enjoyed the limited support of the factions involved. The Israelis withdrew from the Beirut area to fortified positions in the south. The Marines conducted foot patrols in the area outside their perimeters and began to train Lebanese soldiers, outfitting them with USMC camouflage uniforms. The operation functioned without serious incident throughout the rest of 1982.

C. DOCTRINE

In November 1974, the Army eliminated the concept of stability operations with the publication of FM 100-20 *Internal Defense and Development: US Army Doctrine*. This manual placed the primary burden of responsibility for internal defense and development (IDAD) on the host country, in line with the Nixon doctrine. Parallels to peace operations can be found in the section on Border Operations. Tasks included security of populated areas, operations of authorized points of entry, refugee control,

⁵⁷Gregory, Frank, p. 25.

⁵⁸Bolger, pp. 173-174.

enforcement of movement and travel restrictions, reconnaissance and surveillance, and barrier and denial operations.⁵⁹ Operational guidelines included the desire to minimize violence. Humanitarian assistance was to be administered by the Agency for International Development (AID), the Department of State, and the Department of Agriculture.

The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 *Operations* eliminated the Spectrum of War and proclaimed that AirLand Battle doctrine would apply "to fight and win in battles, large or small, against whatever foe, wherever we may be sent to war."⁶⁰ The Army declared that "The war in the Middle East in 1973 might well portend the nature of modern battle."⁶¹ The Army's keystone manual in effect declared that the Army's only mission was to fight the land battle.

The 1981 edition of FM 100-20 was retitled *Low Intensity Conflict*. This manual focused on how to fight and win in situations short of war. Under the category of "Other Operations", the Army recognized peacekeeping for the first time. "PEACEKEEPING FORCE. The United States may be called upon to provide support to a UN or treaty organization effort to establish a regional peacekeeping force in a contested area involving TWO OR MORE NATIONS."⁶² This definition of peacekeeping was not expanded upon in the manual and no guidance was given on how to train or prepare for an operation, nor on how to conduct an operation.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 *The AirLand Battle and Corps 86*, published in March 1981, reinforced the message that the Army's primary focus would remain on winning the land battle. "The concept emphasizes the all too frequently ignored or misunderstood lesson of history--that once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of

⁵⁹FM 100-20 *Internal Defense and Development: US Army Doctrine*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, November 1974), pp. 5-16 - 17.

⁶⁰FM 100-5 *Operations*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, July 1976), p. 1-1.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 2-2.

⁶²FM 100-20 *Low Intensity Conflict*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, January 1981), p. 15 (Original capitalization).

military aims, military forces must win something--else there will be no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically."⁶³ AirLand Battle dealt primarily with modern, well equipped forces, but there was no limitation placed on the concept. Once again, no other operational environment other than large-scale conventional war was recognized.

The final manual published during this epoch was the 1982 version of FM 100-5 *Operations*. The manual stressed that "An Army's operational concept is the core of its doctrine. It is the way the Army fights its battles and campaigns, including tactics, procedures, organizations, support, equipment, and training. The concept must be broad enough to describe operations in all anticipated circumstances."⁶⁴ The manual included a chapter on contingency operations. "In support of national policy, the NCA directs contingency operations involving US forces overseas. Usually such operations are urgent. The size of a contingency force, its mission, and the area of operations vary."⁶⁵ No examples of contingency operations are given, but the manual clearly dictates that AirLand Battle doctrine will apply. Thus, the AirLand Battle concept was the only doctrinal guidance for the conduct of military operations within the Army's keystone manual.

D. MILITARY LITERATURE

The majority of the articles published during this epoch debated AirLand Battle and the changes to doctrine through the implementation of this new concept. The first of six articles relating to peace operations was published in 1975.⁶⁶ COL Coverdale and CPT Snyder began their article with a hypothetical requirement for US peacekeepers to prevent

⁶³TRADOC Pamphlet 525-25 The AirLand Battle and Corps 86, (Ft. Monroe, VA: TRADOC, March 1981), p. 2.

⁶⁴FM 100-5 Operations, (Washington, DC: USGPO, August 1982), p. 2-1.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 16-1.

⁶⁶Coverdale, Craig G. & Snyder, Albert J., "The Army as Keeper of Mideast Peace," *Army*, November 1975, pp. 11-17.

a war between Israel and Egypt, after the Soviets declare that they have dispatched peacekeepers. They explain the US aversion to peacekeeping as a means to keep the Soviets out of peacekeeping, fearing they would use it to expand their influence into a region. They note that peacekeeping was considered a stability operation, but that stability operations no longer exist and that there is currently no doctrinal guidance published. They believe that Special Forces are the best units for peacekeeping, followed by a Ranger battalion and then a battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division.

They believed that the obvious steps to be taken included developing doctrine for UN peacekeeping operations, qualifying a group of officers for this type duty, orientating the military towards these types of operations, and the development of specialized peacekeeping equipment. The quote Secretary of Defense Schlesinger as stating "We're not putting together a defense establishment that is primarily directed toward protecting the United States against an overland attack. The defense establishment of the United States is designed to provide worldwide military balance and a vision of the U.S. role."⁶⁷ They conclude by stating that "Clearly a peacekeeping role for the U.S. Army could be an essential element in this new vision and a means of maintaining the worldwide military balance."⁶⁸

The next article was published in December 1975 and discussed the structural strengths and weaknesses of UNEF II.⁶⁹ Pelcovits defined peacekeeping as "a military presence auxiliary to political action, designed to hold the line for peaceful adjustment by imposing restraints on the will to resume fighting."⁷⁰ He believed that the most important lesson to be learned from the Middle East is that peacekeeping has a short half-life, that

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 17.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 17.

⁶⁹Pelcovits, N.A., "UN Peacekeeping and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Military Review*, December 1975, pp. 32-48.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 47.

diplomatic initiatives are essential to maintain an effective operation. He notes the importance of superpower support, but does not discuss the merits of deploying US peacekeeping contingents.

Two articles addressed the Sinai Field Mission. In November 1977, CPT McCay discussed the SFM and its impact on Middle East peace initiatives.⁷¹ The article explained the mission of the SFM and the respect for US impartiality which has resulted from the operation. In December 1979, MAJ Napoliello discussed the promising possibility of the successful use of a similar force on the Golan Heights.⁷² He believed that the SFM created an atmosphere of trust between Egypt and Israel and demonstrated America's resolve for peace in the region. Neither author addressed the issue of US military forces in peacekeeping operations.

In December 1977, Major Wise proclaimed that peacekeeping had become a potential assignment for all armies, including the US Army.⁷³ He noted that "Peacekeeping, as practiced in recent UN operations, is nonviolent, neutral, third-party intervention...it is always 'noncoercive and impartial'. It is not 'peace enforcement', the term now being applied to a Dominican Republic-type operation."⁷⁴ He does not address the issue of whether the US should contribute to peacekeeping operations, believing that a doctrine for such operations must be developed first. The best structure for the force is a mechanized battalion with three platoons of APCs and proper support augmentation. Training should consist of adherence to standard operating procedures (SOPs), the rapid and secure movement of units to establish outposts and zones, and individual skills including construction of defensive positions and an understanding of local customs and

⁷¹McKay, Karen, "Watch on the Sinai," *Army*, November 1977, pp. 18-25.

⁷²Napoliello, David A., "The Sinai Field Mission: A Step Towards Peace in the Middle East," *Parameters*, December 1979, pp. 20-27.

⁷³Wise, James C., "How Not to Fight: Putting Together a US Army Force for a UN Peacekeeping Operation," *Military Review*, December 1977, pp. 20-31.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, p. 20.

the history of the situation. He urges the use of a simulation developed by the International Peace Academy (IPA) which would help leaders and staff officers in the planning and execution of peacekeeping operations.

The final article published in this epoch was in October 1980 by LTC Child.⁷⁵ Child endorsed the IPA definition of peacekeeping "the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace."⁷⁶ He defines peace-enforcing as "the imposition of peace by an outside force, either unilaterally or multilaterally."⁷⁷ He then turns his attention to Latin America and discusses the fourteen peacekeeping or peaceobserving efforts in the Inter-American system. He notes that the Dominican Republic Operation was the only peace force to be established, but doubts that it can be considered a peacekeeping mission. Because of the belief by Latin American countries that the US used the OAS as a cover for unilateral interests, he believed that the US should only commit logistical support to Latin America. At UN level, he believed that the US should only offer diplomatic support to keep the big power problems out of peacekeeping efforts.

E. SUMMARY

The second epoch was characterized by a retrenchment in doctrine which initially focused completely on AirLand Battle. This was in response to the failure to accomplish US objectives in Vietnam and the new national security strategy of the Nixon administration. The 1973 War provided a major impetus to AirLand Battle because of the ability of the Israelis to fight outnumbered and win against Soviet equipment, a situation

⁷⁵Child, John, "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American System," *Military Review*, October 1980, pp. 40-54.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 42.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 42.

which NATO faced. LIC became an operational category in 1981 and listed peacekeeping as a possible mission, but provided no doctrinal guidance on how to plan or execute the mission. LIC itself was a secondary mission which was not mentioned in the 1982 revision of FM 100-5 *Operations*.

The UN established two operations during this time period, both of limited scope and manpower. The US participated in one of the operations, providing MILOBs and the SFM to UNEF II. There were three peace operations involving multinational forces. The MFO was established as a result of the fear of a Soviet veto over extending UNEF II, caused by the escalation in the Cold War following Reagan's election. Failure of UNIFIL to effectively operate in Southern Lebanon and the subsequent invasion by the IDF was the impetus for the formation of the MNF I to remove the PLO from Lebanon. At the request of the Lebanese government after President Bashir Gemayal was assassinated and the massacres occurred at the refugee camps, the MNF II was established.

Although there were only six articles discussing peace operations during this epoch, the articles began to stress the need for doctrine. Definitions were discussed and basic principles for peacekeeping were developed for consideration. Two articles opined on the proper force structure for peacekeeping operations and discussed required training, believing that the US Army may be called upon to perform peacekeeping missions. However, there were no articles published concerning the MFO even though a battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division had completed the first rotation in October 1982.

The process of constructing the meaning of peace operations began during this epoch. The deployment of Army units to the MFO represented a commitment to the use of peacekeeping to achieve foreign policy objectives. Recognition by a few officers of the need for doctrinal guidance represented a belief that the Army may have to conduct peace operations in the future. However, the process had only begun. Political guidance was not issued, key military leaders were silent and doctrinal guidance was not developed for peace operations.

IV. UNILATERALISM TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR: 1983 - 1989

A. POLITICAL FACTORS

The Reagan administration demonstrated its disdain for the UN and multilateralism through a series of actions that began with the Grenada operation. In the following years the administration continued to abandon the traditional policy of multilateral support to regional problems. A series of unilateral actions followed, including the bombing of Libya and the financing of anti-Communist insurgents in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. The US abandoned the UN as a forum for solving international problems and a venue for pursuing foreign policy objectives. In October 1983, the Kassebaum Amendment authorized the limiting of contributions to the UN.

In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the USSR. As he slowly began to restructure Soviet domestic and foreign policy, the UN became an important forum for Soviet declaratory policy. In September 1987, Gorbachev called for the enhancement of numerous UN functional areas, including peacekeeping forces. Gorbachev stressed the need for mutual security and increased contacts among countries to achieve a more active global diplomacy. In a surprise announcement, the USSR announced that they would pay their assessment for the UN forces in Lebanon. This abrupt change in Soviet foreign policy and the development of a strategy for using the UN to achieve Soviet interests highlighted a corresponding lack of US strategy for the use of the UN.

In January 1987, President Reagan published the *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Without specifically citing the UN, He declared that "Multilateral diplomacy and participation in international organizations provide an opportunity to address global problems and share the task of solving them."⁷⁸ He asserted that US diplomacy had assisted in the enhancement of US goals, including peacekeeping, but did

⁷⁸Reagan, Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: USGPO, January 1987), p. 10.

not state what role peacekeeping played in the attainment of national security objectives. However, the reference to multilateralism signalled the gradual shift away from pure Unilateralism. A surprise announcement by the USSR came later that year with a declaration that reimbursement would begin on the Soviet debts towards the regular budget and peacekeeping assessments.

In January 1988, President Reagan published the second *National Security Strategy of the United States*. He expanded on multilateral diplomacy by specifically citing the UN as an international organization which provided a forum for addressing problems. He discussed the apparent changes in the USSR, but warned that it was too early for the US to let its guard down. In a second reference to the UN, he stated that the US was prepared to play a constructive role in the UN to achieve a just settlement in Cambodia. The USSR continued to demonstrate its resolve in using the UN as a forum to accomplish foreign policy objectives by agreeing to allow the UN to sponsor indirect talks on Afghanistan. The USSR then exerted diplomatic pressures on Cuba and Vietnam to reach negotiated settlements in Angola and Cambodia.

As the USSR continued to build bridges through the UN, the US slowly recognized that it was losing ground within the UN. In his final speech to the General Assembly in September 1988, President Reagan praised the peacekeeping efforts of the UN and promised that the US would pay its debts to the UN. President Bush addressed the General Assembly in September 1989, but gave only cautious support to the UN. He later expanded his support through Thomas Pickering, his UN representative, declaring a desire to make better use of the UN peacekeeping and peacemaking machinery to assist in resolution of Third World problems. On November 3, 1989, Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky held a joint press conference at the UN. Declaring a new commitment to US-USSR cooperation in the UN, they sponsored a resolution designed to improve the effectiveness of the UN in maintaining peace and security. Six days later the Berlin Wall fell, symbolizing the end of the Cold War.

B. OPERATIONS

MNF II

The MNF II began to experience problems in the beginning of 1983 as the factions began to view the training of the mostly Christian LAF with distrust. On April 18, the US embassy was destroyed by a suicide bomber, killing sixty-six. On August 29, the Marines suffered their first casualties when two were killed in a mortar attack. Two days later, President Reagan ordered an additional 2,000 Marines to the Mediterranean.⁷⁹ This represented the first US escalation in the level of force to be used by the MNF II.

On September 8, a US Navy warship fired on a reported Druze artillery position on the outskirts of Beirut. Five days later, President Reagan authorized the Marines to use naval and air support for self-defense or to provide aid to the defense of Western forces and the LAF. On September 17, the US shelled Syrian positions in Lebanon with naval gunfire. Two days later, Congress authorized US participation in the MNF II for an additional eighteen months.⁸⁰ By this time, the MNF II had lost all vestiges of neutrality and was no longer viewed by the factions involved as a legitimate force.⁸¹

Although the situation on the ground had clearly changed, the US continued to adhere to the original mandate. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were not changed and the Marines did little to improve their defensive posture. On October 23, suicide truck bombers attacked the US and French MNF II headquarters and killed 241 Marines and 58 French soldiers. Four days later, the countries contributing to the MNF II reaffirmed their intentions to remain in Lebanon. The MNF II initially increased its level of commitment and force within Lebanon, but then gradually began a withdrawal of combat troops which ended on March 31, 1984.

⁷⁹McDermott, Anthony & Skjelsbaek, Kjell, The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-1984, (Miami, FL: Florida International University Press, 1991), pp. 272-274.

⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 274-275.

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 96-97.

URGENT FURY

In March 1979, Maurice Bishop seized control of the government of Grenada in a bloodless coup. In 1983, Bishop visited the US and divulged that he was worried that the government was leaning too far towards the left. Upon his return, he was placed under house arrest. On October 18, Bishop was freed by his supporters, but the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) found him and massacred over 100 civilians, executing Bishop and three prominent supporters. The US military began to prepare for an operation to evacuate over 600 students and 400 civilians from the island, with a possible add-on mission to occupy the country and remove the current government.

On October 23, The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) met and requested a US intervention. The next day, Chief of State Sir Paul Scoon requested that a peacekeeping force from the US and the OECS be established to stabilize the situation. These two actions served as justification for Operation Urgent Fury, which commenced with assaults by Rangers and Special Forces units on October 25. They were opposed by approximately 800 Cubans, 600 PRA, and 2,500 Grenadan militia. By October 28, all resistance was subdued and the island was under the control of US forces. Eighteen Americans were killed and 116 wounded in the operation. On November 2, the US began to redeploy its forces and all had left the island, except a small peacekeeping force of about 300, by mid-December.⁸²

UNGOMAP

On April 14, 1989, the Geneva Accords were signed by the Afghan and Pakistan governments. They provided for noninterference and nonintervention, guarantees by the US and USSR, and the voluntary return of refugees. On May 15, the UN Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was deployed. It consisted of 50 MILOBs whose mandate was to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the implementation of the Geneva Accords. The mission was completed in 1989.

⁸²Leckie, Robert, The Wars of America, Volume II: From 1900-1992, (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1992), p. 1091.

UNIIMOG

On July 20, 1987, the Security Council passed Resolution 598, which called for a cease-fire, a return to internationally recognized boundaries and the observation of a cease-fire accord by a UN force. On August 8, the Security Council approved the implementation of the resolution and began to deploy an unarmed military observer force. The Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) consisted of 350 observers from 26 countries. Their mandate was to establish cease-fire lines, monitor compliance, supervise and verify withdrawals, investigate violations, oversee prisoner of war exchanges, and to negotiate with the two sides to obtain a lasting settlement. The force began to drawdown after Iraq invaded Kuwait and the mission ended in early 1991.

UNAVEM I

The US sponsored peace negotiations which resulted in an agreement for a cease-fire and the recognition of Namibian independence in August 1988. Security Council Resolution 626 passed on December 20, 1988, creating the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I). The mandate called for a force of unarmed observers to verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola according to the timetable agreed to by Angola and Cuba. The force, consisting of 70 MILOBs, verified Cuban withdrawal and completed the mission in July 1991, when the last Cubans departed.

JUST CAUSE

On February 15, 1988, Manuel Noriega, commander of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) was indicted on drug charges by federal grand juries. One month later, President Reagan imposed economic sanctions on the country. In May 1989, Noriega overturned the presidential elections and the PDF increased their level of harassment towards American military personnel and their dependents. President Bush sent reinforcements to the Canal Zone to protect US interests, but the deployment had little affect on the situation. On October 3, Giroldi Vega staged an unsuccessful coup, resulting in another backlash against US citizens. As tensions rose, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) began to plan for a possible invasion of the country.

On December 15, Noriega was declared Maximum Leader by the National Assembly. The assembly then declared a state of war with the US. The next day, the PDF killed Marine LT Paez and severely beat a naval officer and his wife who had witnessed the killing. President Bush invoked international law regarding the right of a state to protect its citizens abroad and the rights within the 1979 Panama Canal treaties for the defense of the line of transit and immediately began to deploy forces for an invasion.

The invasion began on December 20, with multiple attacks by a Joint Task Force (JTF). By the end of the day, most of the objectives of Operation Just Cause had been accomplished, but Noriega was still on the loose. On December 24, Noriega requested and was granted political asylum at the Papal Nunciature. While the standoff continued outside the nunciature, US forces continued to secure Panama City. The Dignity Battalions caused the greatest problem and the US feared the possibility of a protracted guerrilla war. On January 3, 1990, Noriega surrendered and was transported to the US for trial, ending all significant resistance by Noriega loyalists.

UNTAG

The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was the second peace operation which resulted from US sponsored peace negotiations in Africa. UNTAG was authorized by Security Council Resolution 435 to supervise Namibian independence. The mandate included a more comprehensive settlement plan which included the monitoring of cease-fires, elections and the South African Police. Deployed in April 1989, UNTAG consisted of a 2,550 man peacekeeping force, 300 MILOBs, and 1,500 civilian police monitors. It was the first deployment of a comprehensive force to attempt to achieve political objectives through physical presence since ONUC. The key to its success was the desire of the interested parties to accept a UN solution. Elections were held in November and the operation ended in March 1990.

ONUCA

The UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), was authorized on November 7, 1989, to verify compliance of the Esquipulas II agreement signed by Costa

Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The force, deployed on December 7, 1989, consisted of 260 unarmed MOs and a Venezuelan Infantry battalion with a mandate to verify that none of the signatories were supporting irregular military forces, to supervise a cease-fire and separation of forces, and to supervise the demobilization the Contras. The mission ended in January 1992, after the demobilization of the Contras was complete. This was the first UN peace operation in the American sphere of influence.

C. DOCTRINE

The new TRADOC PAM 525-44 proclaimed "Low intensity conflict will continue to be an increasing threat to our national security and represents the most likely form of conflict the US Army will be involved in for the remainder of the century."⁸³ The pamphlet stressed that AirLand Battle doctrine was applicable for all levels of conflict, but that the basic tenets would have a broader meaning and that the application of principles would be different. Although peacekeeping was not listed as an example of a LIC mission, it was discussed. Peacekeeping operations were defined as "Military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict."⁸⁴

The pamphlet stated that the US Army could participate in multilateral or unilateral peacekeeping operations. Four special requirements for peacekeeping were listed. First, soldiers must possess the skills required for war, but be trained so that his first reaction to a situation is to act as an intermediary. Second, an augmented infantry battalion is considered the basic unit and should train on patrolling, observation, surveillance, investigation, patience and common sense. Third, the requirement to assist isolated outposts must be planned for. And fourth, that a dynamic environment may require the

⁸³TRADOC PAM 525-44 US Army Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict, (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, February 1986), Foreword.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. G-3.

rapid relocation of forces. The missions of cease-fire supervision and law and order maintenance were listed as common missions. Training requirements emphasized normal military skills, an ability to impartially arbitrate and mediate, and an attitude of firmness, fairness, and friendliness.

The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 *Operations* hinted at a return to the spectrum of conflict by discussing high- and mid-intensity conflict and low intensity conflict in Chapter 1, "Challenges for the US Army." Within the low intensity conflict section, peacekeeping operations were addressed for the first time in the Army's keystone manual. It received one paragraph:

As in the past, the Army will also participate in peacekeeping operations which support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in an area of armed conflict. Such operations may be unilaterally or internationally manned and directed. Whatever the case, they will be sensitive and will require a high degree of unit and individual discipline in the forces committed. Units of peacekeeping forces use force only in cases of self defense.⁸⁵

Contingency operations were described as military actions that are taken after diplomatic actions have failed or require supplementation to succeed. "Contingency operations involving Army forces may provide a rapid show of force in support of a threatened ally to deter aggression by a hostile neighbor, react to the invasion of a friendly government, protect the property of US nationals, rescue hostages or perform other tasks as directed by the NCA."⁸⁶ The first operation, a show of force, would be considered a preventive deployment under the category of preventive diplomacy in FM 100-23 *Peace Operations*.

⁸⁵FM 100-5 *Operations*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, May 1986), p. 5.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 169.

D. MILITARY LITERATURE

The first article published in this epoch was by MAJ Homan, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps.⁸⁷ Homan asserts that the MFO is the first peacekeeping operation for the US. He explains the reasons for the US participation and discusses the mandate, personnel strengths, logistical support and communications requirements of the mission. He concludes by stating that "in the absence of unanimity in the Security Council, a peacekeeping force, which is established outside the UN framework but based on established principles of international law, can contribute positively to international peace and security."⁸⁸

Two articles discussed aspects of the MNF II and gave different descriptions of its mission. The first article was a critique of the press coverage in Grenada, which lists the suicide bombing as a reason for press sloppiness. "The Marines had been very much in the hearts and minds of the country because of their peacekeeping performance in Lebanon and the tragic explosion that killed more than 230 of them a few days before Grenada."⁸⁹ The second article discussed the bombing and argued that it was an example of unconventional warfare and not a terrorist attack. Within the article, the mission of the Marines was described as an effort "to help 'stabilize' the political-military chaos that prevails there."⁹⁰

In October 1984, Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Wickham, wrote an article to detail the new challenges that the Army faced.⁹¹ He briefly discussed the

⁸⁷Homan, Cornelis, "MFO: Peacekeeping in the Middle East," *Military Review*, October 1980, pp. 40-54.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 13.

⁸⁹Binder, L., "The Army Was in Grenada, Too," *Army*, December 1993, p. 15.

⁹⁰Simpson, Charles M., "'Paranoia' as Weapon in Unconventional Warfare," *Army*, April 1984, p. 30.

⁹¹Wickham, John A., "Today's Army: Landpower in Transition," *Army*, October 1984, pp. 21-33.

contribution of peacekeeping to deterrence and mentions the MFO and observer duty in Israel and southern Lebanon as examples. Grenada was described as a "rescue operation" which accomplished the mission. He notes that 43% of the Army is forward deployed and that the trend is likely to increase as the Army participates in more peacekeeping and observer missions.

There were five articles that debated the merits of LIC doctrine. Three of the articles argued that peacekeeping did not belong within LIC doctrine. In 1985, COL Paschall argued that LIC was becoming a catchall by including peacekeeping operations, a peripheral activity that could obscure the real threat of insurgencies.⁹² Although he claimed that there was no tie between LIC and peacekeeping, he did recognize that there was a need to develop peacekeeping doctrine. In 1986, MAJ Zais asserted that the definition of LIC was so flawed that it did not even facilitate the development of doctrine.⁹³ His objective was to match missions to operational force structure. He proclaimed that even though doctrine did not exist, Military Police were the most appropriate force for peacekeeping operations. He labeled Grenada a large-scale strike operation and the deployment of Marines to Lebanon a show of force.⁹⁴ In 1987, COL Swain argued that LIC doctrine was fundamentally flawed and that two parallel manuals were required, one for war (FM 100-5) and the other for operations short of war. He asserted that AirLand Battle doctrine was not applicable to operations short of war and that FM 100-20 required significant revision to recognize this fact. Peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance belonged in a revised FM 100-20, which should abandon the term LIC and adopt the term operations short of war.

⁹²Paschal, Rod, "Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine: Who Needs It?", *Parameters*, July 1985, pp. 33-45.

⁹³Swain, Richard M., "Removing SQUARE Pegs from ROUND Holes: Low Intensity Conflict and the Army Doctrine," *Military Review*, December 1987, pp. 2-15.

⁹⁴Zais, Mitchell, "LIC: Matching Missions and Forces," *Military Review*, August 1986, pp. 89-99.

A fourth article relating to LIC asserted that peacekeeping belonged within the category of LIC. In 1986, LTC Bond asserted that TRADOC PAM 525-44 *US Army Operational Concept for Low-Intensity Conflict* was correct in including peace operations in LIC.⁹⁵ He labeled the MNF in Beirut a peacekeeping force and the Grenada operation a strike/raid operation that became a peacekeeping operation after the initial resistance was quelled and the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force was established.

In the final article relating to LIC, GEN Galvin explained that new doctrine faces difficulties because of the long process of consensus building.⁹⁶ Within this process, more time is spent overcoming resistance than in examining new ideas. He explains how LIC doctrine was developed in response to the relatively new phenomena of entire populations being involved in war. Although he was referring to the development of LIC doctrine, this same process applies to peace operations.

In 1986, an article described the training which the 2/504th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division received prior to its deployment to the Sinai.⁹⁷ During a sixteen day Army Readiness Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), each platoon conducted night raids, called in artillery on snipers, and participated in live-fire exercises. After eight rotations to the Sinai, the Army had not yet standardized a training regiment for deploying battalions to peacekeeping duty with the MFO.

Two articles described the missions of the Army and asserted that peacekeeping was an important mission. In 1987, an article described the need for a credible landpower that could thwart Soviet aggression in the age of nuclear parity.⁹⁸ Peacekeeping was listed

⁹⁵Bond, Peter, "In Search of LIC," *Military Review*, August 1986, pp. 79-88.

⁹⁶Galvin, John, "Uncomfortable Wars: Towards a New Paradigm," *Parameters*, Winter 1986, pp. 2-8.

⁹⁷Maestas, Ruben, "Where the Meat Hits the Grinder: Dress Rehearsal for Sinai Duty," *Army*, May 1986, pp. 34-37.

⁹⁸Petraeus, David, Kaufman, Daniell & Clark, Asa, "Why an Army?", *Army*, February 1987, pp. 26-34.

as a key contribution to international stability and evidence of America's commitment to global peace. The peacekeepers with the MFO and observers in Israel and southern Lebanon were listed as examples. In 1989, Chief of Staff of the Army, Carl Vuono described the changes to the international system and the ability of the Army to respond to these changes.⁹⁹ He asserted that the Army was prepared to execute any mission, including low-intensity conflict and the deployment of peacekeeping forces. He further asserted that the Army had successfully committed peacekeeping forces in recent years, but did not list the operations.

The final article of interest was a description of the Dominican Republic operation.¹⁰⁰ MAJ Greenberg asserted that the operation was initially a strike operation which began on April 30, 1965, and ended on May 1. It then transitioned into unilateral peacekeeping operation on May 3, ending on May 5. On May 6, it became a multilateral peacekeeping operation under the OAS. On August 31, the mandate shifted from neutrality to active support of the interim government, lasting until a new President was elected and the US departed on September 27, 1966. This is the first time that the operation was thoroughly examined in military literature and described as a peacekeeping operation.

E. SUMMARY

The third epoch was characterized by a temporary withdrawal from a multilateral focus which included a strategy for using the UN by the Reagan administration and a restructuring of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR under Gorbachev. Reagan believed that the US needed to bring pressure on the USSR by stressing the military component of national security policy. Capabilities across the entire spectrum of military

⁹⁹Vuono, Carl, "Today's U.S. Army: Trained and Ready In an Era of Change," *Army*, October 1989, pp. 12-32.

¹⁰⁰Greenberg, Lawrence, "The US Dominican Intervention: Success Story," *Parameters*, December 1987, pp. 18-29.

operations were improved to respond to threats throughout the world and the UN was essentially abandoned as a useful forum to address international problems. When Gorbachev assumed power "the oil boom had vanished and the economy of illusion was dead."¹⁰¹ Gorbachev sought to use the UN as a vehicle for changes in foreign policy to reduce its commitments abroad and improve its domestic economy. The apparent changes ongoing within the USSR influenced the decision of the Reagan administration to renew its interest in the UN towards the end of its second term.

The death of 241 Marines in Lebanon was mitigated politically by President Reagan, who took full responsibility. The Grenada operation, which began two days later, quickly refocused the public's attention. The UN began to function more effectively in the mid-1980s as Cold-war tensions eased. Five new peace operations were initiated from 1988-1989. The US did not participate in any of the operations except for providing airlift to UNTAG. The Panama intervention demonstrated US resolve to conduct unilateral interventions when US interests were directly threatened. The establishment of ONUCA in the American sphere of influence represented the Bush administration's confidence in the abilities of the UN and demonstrated that the administration preferred multilateralism to unilateralism.

Army doctrine began to recognize peace operations as being probable missions. The Army began to return to a spectrum of conflict paradigm and stressed that AirLand Battle doctrine was appropriate for all levels of conflict. TRADOC PAM 525-44 included a broad definition of peacekeeping which could apply to a wide range of missions. FM 100-5 *Operations* included peacekeeping for the first time, but gave no doctrinal guidance on how to conduct the mission. The operational category of contingency operations was expanded slightly and listed possible missions, which included shows of force. Although doctrine was beginning to expand, doctrinal guidance on peace operations was essentially nonexistent.

¹⁰¹Remnick, David, Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1994), p. 199.

Peace operations began to receive more attention within the military literature during this epoch. Although opinions varied as to which category of military operations peace operations belonged within, there was a consensus that the Army would continue to be tasked with such missions. The need to develop relevant doctrine to adapt to changes in the international system was stressed. Army Chief of Staff's General Wickham (1984) and General Vuono (1989) described changes to the international system and opined that the likelihood of deploying peacekeeping forces was growing.

The process of constructing the meaning of peace operations continued during this epoch. The Reagan administration began to stress the importance of participating in multinational organizations to achieve US interests. The Bush administration continued the move towards multilateralism by stressing the need to make better use of the UN peacekeeping and peacemaking machinery. Senior Army leaders recognized the importance of peace operations. Doctrine began to address peace operations as Army missions. Military professionals stressed the need to develop coherent doctrine and force structures for the conduct of peace operations. The process had continued, but lack of political guidance, the rarity of operations and definitional problems still hindered the construction of meaning.

V. POST - COLD WAR: 1990 - 1994

A. POLITICAL FACTORS

In January 1990, President Bush urged the Congress to provide full funding for the UN and to repay the arrears of the regular and peacekeeping budgets over the next five years. In the 1990 *National Security Strategy*, President Bush linked UN peacekeeping as a means to reduce the level or likelihood of a US military response to regional problems and highlighted the need for an effective force posture in LIC.¹⁰² Although recognizing the apparent changes in the Soviet Union, he stressed the need to ensure that the military force structure could rapidly adapt to any sudden reversal in Soviet policy.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and set off a crisis in the Middle East. Working through the UN, the administration put together a powerful coalition which forcibly removed Iraq from Kuwait. This action served to bolster Bush's faith in the UN and within the 1991 *National Security Strategy* he declared that in the Gulf war "we saw the United Nations playing the role dreamed of by its founders."¹⁰³ He pledged to strengthen the UN and to pay all arrearage by 1995, adding that he hoped to see the UN play a greater role in peacekeeping. He also pledged to provide humanitarian assistance when needed to assist in achieving national security interests.

In the 1993 *National Security Strategy*, President Bush declared that military force may be used "either to protect our own citizens and interests or at the request of our allies or the United Nations."¹⁰⁴ He asserted that a revitalized UN deserved US support and that the US should strengthen UN peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities by "taking an

¹⁰²Bush, George, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, February 1990).

¹⁰³Bush, George, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, August 1991), p. v.

¹⁰⁴Bush, George, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, January 1993), p. 1.

active role in the full spectrum of U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief planning and support."¹⁰⁵ He clearly articulated that the US must improve its capabilities for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and capabilities necessary for enforcing peace through the UN. To accomplish these objectives, he stated a desire to overhaul the security assistance budget and to review the budget for humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping to ensure adequate financial support to the UN.

President Clinton took office convinced that the UN could solve the world's problems with proper US leadership. In a move which highlighted the prominence of the UN in the administration's foreign policy, Madeleine Albright was made a member of the National Security Council. The Clinton administration sought to use the UN as a means of conducting assertive multilateralism, "a broader strategy in multilateral forums that projects our leadership where it counts."¹⁰⁶ In February 1993, President Clinton ordered that *Presidential Review Directive 13* (PRD 13) be prepared to formulate a policy on peacekeeping. The draft envisioned a more active policy on peacekeeping which would include placing US forces under the operational control of the UN.

PRD 13 was scrapped after continuing debate on the future role of the US in Bosnia and the death of nineteen soldiers on October 3, 1993, in Somalia. Congress cancelled a proposed \$175 million contingency fund to cover peacekeeping costs, withheld 10% of its regular contribution to the UN, canceled the fourth of five payments to cover arrears, and told the President that the US share of peacekeeping had to be cut from 31.7% to 25%.¹⁰⁷ After reviewing PRD 13 and making necessary changes, President Clinton issued *Presidential Decision Directive 25* (PDD 25) in May 1994.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁰⁶Berdal, Mats, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival*, Spring 1994, p. 32.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 34.

PDD 25 states "the primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces remains to fight and win two simultaneous regional conflicts. In this context, peacekeeping can be one useful tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts before they pose direct threats to our national security. Peacekeeping can also serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, regional security, and economic growth."¹⁰⁸ Six major issues are addressed: which peace operations to support; reduction of US costs for UN peace operations; command and control arrangements; reforming and improving UN capabilities to conduct peace operations; reformulating management of US funding for peacekeeping; and developing cooperation between the President, the Congress and the American public on peace operations.

The term peace operations within PDD 25 refers to a spectrum of activities from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. President Clinton asserted that the US would contribute to peace operations when it was in the US national interest and the operation met a list of criteria to safeguard US participation. He vowed that US troops would never fall under foreign command, but could be under foreign operational control if the situation warranted such an action. He urged the Congress to support paying arrears to the UN and to adequately budget for peacekeeping operations, which may fall under the DOD budget. Finally, he declared that UN peace operations were a valuable tool to accomplish US interests and that Congress and the American public must accept and understand their importance.

B. OPERATIONS

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

President Bush immediately condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and began to work through the UN. Security Resolution 660, passed the day of the invasion, demanded an immediate Iraqi withdrawal. Four days later Resolution 661, which invoked Chapter

¹⁰⁸Clinton, Bill, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, (Washington, DC: USGPO, May 1994), p. 1.

VII, levied mandatory sanctions against Iraq. On November 29, Resolution 678 authorized the use of force to remove Iraq from Kuwait after January 15, 1991. The support of the Soviet Union and China represented a new era of cooperation within the UN. Forty countries contributed over 200,000 troops to the US-led coalition operating under UN authority.

UNAVEM II

The UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) was established on May 30, 1991, with a mandate of verifying the peace agreement, monitoring the cease-fire and monitoring the Angolan police. The mandate was later expanded to include the monitoring of elections. The force included 350 MILOBs and 126 police observers. After the elections were held in September 1992, the civil war resumed when factions refused to accept the results. The US provided humanitarian airlift to the operation.

UNIKOM

The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was authorized by Security Council Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991. UNIKOM's mandate is to monitor a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between Kuwait and Iraq to deter violations of the DMZ through its presence. The force consists of 300 MILOBs, with the US and Russia providing 20 each. The force was authorized under Chapter VI, but other operations in the area provide it with implicit military force which could be used.

PROVIDE COMFORT

The repression of minorities within Iraq and the flow of refugees into Turkey resulted in Security Council Resolution 688 being passed on April 5. The resolution condemned Iraq's repression of its civilian population, characterized the flow of refugees as a threat to international peace and security, demanded that Iraq halt its repression, insisted that Iraq allow international humanitarian organizations immediate access, and

demanded that Iraq cooperate with the UN.¹⁰⁹ Although the resolution did not invoke Chapter VII enforcement measures, the US, Britain, and France formed Combined Task Force Provide Comfort as a means of implementing Resolution 688.

The 3d Battalion (Airborne) 325th Infantry Regiment (Airborne Battalion Combat Team) was redeployed to Iraq on April 26. Their mission was to assist in the establishment of temporary refugee camps and to establish and maintain safe areas. As the safe areas were expanded, the battalion conducted a reconnaissance in force and functioned as an interpositioning force to keep the Iraqis and Kurds separated. The ROE restricted the use of force to self-defense and the battalion improvised by using shows of force to ensure Iraqi withdrawals. When the safe area was established, the battalion assumed a more traditional peacekeeping mission and operated checkpoints, conducted patrols, and mediated disputes between Kurdish factions.

MINURSO

The UN's Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was created on April 29, to implement an agreement which would allow Western Saharans the right to choose between independence and a merger with Morocco. MINURSO's mandate was to conduct and supervise the referendum and the force had the authority to suspend laws and regulations that could impede a fair vote. A refusal to adhere to a cease-fire and intransigence by the factions involved have precluded the peaceful settlement envisioned. The force consisted of a Canadian infantry battalion, 300 civilian police, and 550 MILOBs. The US contributed thirty MILOBs .

ONUSAL

The UN Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was the second UN operation in the American sphere of influence. In January 1991, the UN opened an office in El Salvador to verify the protection of human rights. ONUSAL was authorized on May 20 to assist

¹⁰⁹Stromseth, Jane, "Iraq," in Damrosch, Lori, Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 85

in negotiations for a cease-fire. The size of the force was increased on January 14, 1992, and had a mandate to oversee the separation of forces, their assembly in contonement areas, and the disposal of weapons. The US did not contribute to this mission, but conducted peacetime engagement missions with the country.

UNAMIC

The internal war in Cambodia reached a stalemate in 1989 and the factions requested a UN peacekeeping force to supervise the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, to oversee elections, and to supervise the creation of an integrated military. In January 1990, the permanent members of the Security Council published an outline of a plan for a UN peacekeeping force and UN supervised elections. The four major factions agreed to the plan and the UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) began to deploy in late 1991. UNAMIC established communications with the factions, attempted to resolve cease-fire violations, and trained civilians to avoid and report landmines.

UNTAC

The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was approved in March 1992 and the first troops began to arrive two weeks later. UNTAC's mandate was to ensure the political neutrality of the governments by assuming authority over both, to monitor human rights conditions, and to organize and conduct elections. UNTAC consisted of over 22,000 military and civilian personnel. UNTAC encountered numerous problems, but successfully held the elections and transferred power to the elected government. The US contributed 51 MILOBs and airlift to the operation which ended in September 1993.

UNPROFOR

On September 25, 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 713 which enacted an arms embargo against Yugoslavia under Chapter VII. On February 21, 1992, Security Council Resolution 743 authorized the deployment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR I) to establish protected areas and ensure the withdrawal or demobilization of all military and paramilitary units from the areas. On April 7, Security Council

Resolution 749 approved the full deployment of 13,000 UN peacekeepers to implement resolution 743. On May 15, Security Council Resolution 752 demanded an end to Bosnian and Croatian interference, an end to ethnic cleansing and noninterference with humanitarian relief operations. On May 30, Security Council Resolution 757 enacted economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro under Chapter VII. On June 8, Security Council Resolution 758 authorized UN forces to secure the Sarajevo airport and supervise the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the area.

On August 13, UNPROFOR II was authorized under the provisions of Chapter VII to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. On October 9, Security Council Resolution 781 banned all military flights within the former Yugoslavia and authorized Chapter VII enforcement. Although force was authorized, UNPROFOR I and II were hesitant to use it because of their precarious positions. On December 11, Security Council Resolution 795 authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to Macedonia as a preventive measure to contain the conflict.

The US has participated in the UN missions in the former Yugoslavia from the beginning. Navy and AF personnel participate in the embargo and enforcing the no-fly zone. The Army deployed a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital to Zagreb in 1992 and a mechanized infantry company to Macedonia in 1993. Special Forces teams have operated in the area under US command. The Clinton administration has repeatedly promised to send a peacekeeping force of over 20,000 if a comprehensive peace settlement is reached.

UNOSOM I

On April 27, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 751 which authorized the deployment of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to monitor a cease-fire between clans and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM I initially consisted of 50 observers and a 450 man security force. When the limited UN operation did little to end the crisis, President Bush authorized an airlift to provide humanitarian relief on August 16. When the situation continued to deteriorate, President Bush offered to lead a multinational humanitarian assistance operation under UN authority. On

December 3, the Security Council authorized the US-led effort under Chapter VII to restore peace, stability, and law and order within Somalia.

The force, consisting of the US, Australia, Canada, Italy, and France, became the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The US portion of the operation was called Operation Restore Hope. The mission was to "secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGO's in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to U.N. peacekeeping forces."¹¹⁰ The operation began on December 9, and by the end of the year the joint-force totalled over 25,000 with over 10,000 soldiers on the ground.

The force had seized and secured all vital ports and food distribution centers by December 28. By late February, the situation on the ground was considered secure for the provisions of humanitarian relief operations stipulated in the American mission statement. UNITAF had conducted operations to partially disarm the population and was ready to transition the operation in Somalia to UN control.

ONUMOZ

On December 16, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 797 establishing the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). The mandate was to verify the cease-fire, elections, and police neutrality in accordance with the General Peace Agreement of October 4, and to provide humanitarian assistance. Elections were held October 27-29, 1994, and the mission ended on December 9. The US provided MILOBs and logistical support to the operation.

UNOSOM II

On March 26, 1993, Security Council Resolution 814 established the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The mandate, authorized under Chapter VII, included

¹¹⁰Allard, Kenneth, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 16.

disarming the Somali clans, establishing a central government and ensuring a secure environment throughout the country. The US provided over 3,000 logistics personnel and an infantry battalion for a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). The force was under US tactical command and had a mission to conduct "military operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and political reconciliation in Somalia."¹¹¹

On June 5, 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an ambush blamed on supporters of Muhammad Aided. The Security Council passed Resolution 837 the next day, demanding the immediate apprehension of those responsible. The US deployed Task Force Ranger, consisting of forces from the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), to assist in the apprehension. On October 3, 18 US soldiers were killed attempting to capture those responsible for the Pakistani ambush. After a brief build-up of forces in Somalia, the US began to withdraw. After all US forces departed, the remnants of UNISOM II had to be evacuated by Marines in March 1994.

UNOMUR

In June 1993 the Security Council passed Resolution 846 establishing the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (ONOMUR) to ensure that military assistance to Rwandan rebels did not cross the border. In August, the belligerents signed the Arusha peace agreement. ONOMUR did not address the deteriorating conditions within Rwanda and was administratively integrated into a second UN operation in September 1994.

UNOMIG

On August 24, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 858 establishing the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The force consisted of 88 MILOBs with a mandate of verifying compliance with the July 27 Cease-fire Agreement between Georgia and separatist forces in Abkhazia. The cease-fire was broken in September, but the December 1 Memorandum of Understanding provided a forum to reach a settlement. The

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 20.

Security Council authorized an additional 50 MILOBs on December 22. The US did not contribute to this mission.

UNOMIL

On September 22, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 866 establishing the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The force consisted of some 300 MILOBs with a mandate of monitoring the cease-fire, observing elections, and coordinating humanitarian assistance. UNOMIL worked in cooperation with peacekeepers from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the first instance of a UN peacekeeping operation being established with a regional organization. The US did not participate in this operation.

UNMIH

On September 30, 1991, the first democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was ousted in a bloody coup. In September 1992, the joint UN/OAS International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was dispatched to monitor human-rights abuses. When OAS economic sanctions failed to affect the situation, the Security Council passed Resolution 841 on June 16, 1993, establishing an oil and arms embargo. On July 3, 1993, General Cedras and Aristide signed the Governors Island Agreement which was to restore Aristide to power by October 30. On September 23, the Security Council passed Resolution 867 authorizing an expansion of MICIVIH to assist in the transition. In early October it became clear that Cedras was unwilling to cede power. When US and Canadian military components were turned away at the port on October 11, all UN police and military personnel departed Haiti.

A series of Security Council resolutions tightened the embargo on Haiti. On July 31, 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 940 which authorized the establishment of a multinational force and the use of force to restore Aristide to power and the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to accept control of the operation after the country was stabilized. On September 18, a forced entry was averted when Cedras learned of the departure of the 82nd Airborne Division and agreed to voluntarily vacate the country. The

US-led multinational force landed the next day and there were over 19,000 soldiers on the ground by October 17.

The mission was to "establish a secure environment for the restoration of constitutional government...other measures include neutralizing armed opposition, preserving essential civic order and protecting the safety of U.S. citizens and the international presence in the country, including humanitarian relief."¹¹² On January 30, 1995, the UN authorized the deployment of a military component for UNMIH and established a transition date of March 31. General Kinzer was selected by the UN to command of the military component of UNMIH, making him the first American to command a UN peace operation.

UNAMIR

On October 5, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 872 authorizing the establishment of a 2,500 man military contingent, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The mandate consisted of a four phased operation to promote the establishment of a government, provide security to refugees, coordinate humanitarian assistance, supervise disengagement and demobilization of factions, and provide security for elections. In April 1994 the Rwandan president died in a plane crash and the country disintegrated into ethnic warfare and the UN force decreased to 450 troops. On May 17, the Security Council passed Resolution 988 authorizing a force of 5,500, but the US argued against the deployment of the whole force and only a 675 man contingent was deployed.

On June 8, the Security Council passed Resolution 925 authorizing the rest of the 5,500 troops with a mandate to provide secure areas to protect refugees and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. On June 22, lack of support to the operation led the Security Council to pass Resolution 929 authorizing the French to intervene militarily to accomplish Resolution 925. On July 29, President Clinton ordered the military to conduct operations

¹¹²Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, (Washington, DC: USGPO, October 7, 1994), pp. 3-4.

in Rwanda to provide humanitarian assistance and achieve the objectives of Resolution 925. By mid-August over 1,600 soldiers from the 325th Infantry, 10th and 3rd Special Forces, and support units were in Africa conducting Operation *Support Hope*. The US force did not operate under the UN and were redeployed on September 29 after UNAMIR was fully established.

C. DOCTRINE

The 1990 revision of FM 100-20 *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* dedicated a chapter to peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations were defined as "military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict, to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate diplomatic resolution to a conflict between the belligerents."¹¹³ The principles of peacekeeping operations included: *consent* - between disputing parties, participating nations and interested states; *neutrality* - amongst the peacekeepers; *balance* - geographic, political and functional composition of the force; *single-manager control* - a clear chain of command; *concurrent action* - on the diplomatic front; *unqualified sponsor support* - host nations allow freedom of action to the force; *freedom of movement* - in the mandated area of operation; and *self-defense* - the inherent right within the ROE to self-protection.

Peacemaking operations were defined as "a type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force."¹¹⁴ These operations were described as a means to stop a violent conflict to force the belligerent parties to adopt political and diplomatic methods to resolve problems. Because the objective was political in nature the level of force should be sufficient to stop the conflict, but applied with discretion. The manual also included an annex on how to prepare an area handbook for peacekeeping operations.

¹¹³FM 100-20 *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, December 1990), p. Glossary-6.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. Glossary-6.

The 1991 TRADOC PAM 525-5 *AirLand Operations* introduced the concept of an operational continuum. Within the theater strategic environment are three ascending levels of hostility: peacetime competition, conflict, and war. Operations short-of-war could occur in an environment of conflict or peacetime competition, while warfighting situations could occur in an environment of war or conflict. Operations short-of-war, which encompass support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations and contingency operations, were considered to be the greatest threat to US national interests for the next decade. However, none of these operations were defined and the operations short-of-war received a total of two pages. Most of the manual described changes to AirLand Battle doctrine.

The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 *Operations* included the three-tiered operational continuum and changed operations short-of-war to Operations Other Than War (OOTW). OOTW were defined as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."¹¹⁵ Figure 1 was used to highlight the range of military operations, the environment that they are conducted in, and the goals they serve. The manual expanded its scope to include chapters on force projection, joint operations, combined operations and operations other than war.

The principles of OOTW included: *objective* - clearly defined, decisive and attainable; *unity of effort* - toward every objective; *legitimacy* - sustain the willing acceptance of the populace; *perseverance* - measured, protracted application of military capabilities; *restraint* - disciplined application of force through ROE; and *security* - protection of forces at all times. Operations that are included in peace operations (FM 100-23) include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and shows of force. New definitions included *peacemaking* - a diplomatic process or military actions to end a dispute and *peace enforcement* - military intervention to forcefully restore peace.

¹¹⁵FM 100-5 *Operations*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, June 1993), p. Glossary-6.

States of the Environment	Goal	Military Operations			Examples
WAR	Fight and Win	WAR	COMBAT		*Large-scale combat operations *Attack *Defend
CONFLICT	Deter War and Resolve Conflict	OTHER THAN WAR		NONCOMBAT	*Strikes and Raids *Peace Enforcement *Support to Insurgency *Antiterrorism *Peacekeeping *NEO
PEACETIME	Promote Peace	OTHER THAN WAR			*Counterdrug *Disaster Relief *Civil Support *Peacebuilding *Nation Assistance

FM 100-5 *Operations*, p. 2-1

Figure 1. Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment

In September 1993, Joint Pub 3-0 *Doctrine for Joint Operations* was published as the keystone document for joint doctrine. The same principles governing OOTW in the 1993 FM 100-5 *Operations* were used in this manual for military operations other than war. All of the terms and definitions in this manual relating to peace operations were provided for information and proposed for inclusion in other manuals, to include Joint Pub 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Peace operations were divided into three general areas: peacemaking (diplomatic actions), peacekeeping (noncombat military operations), and peace enforcement (coercive use of force).

Peace operations were defined as "operations not involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate."¹¹⁶ Other pertinent definitions were proposed for *peace enforcement* - use or threat of force pursuant to UN authorization, *peacemaking* - actions taken through Chapter VI of the UN Charter, *preventive diplomacy* - actions taken before violence occurs, and *traditional peacekeeping* - deployment of UN, regional or coalition presence with the consent of all parties concerned to facilitate implementation of an existing truce in support of diplomatic efforts.

In April 1994, Joint Pub 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations* provides current doctrine for UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The manual acknowledges that there is no universally accepted definition for peacekeeping and provides a restrictive definition for the military. Peacekeeping is defined as "Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement."¹¹⁷

The manual lists three broad roles that the US may perform in PKOs: *peacekeeping support* - funding and logistical support (supplies, airlift and sealift); *observer missions* - individual military observer (MILOBS); and *peacekeeping forces* - individuals for staff duty, specialized teams for support, or combat units with supporting units. There are three tasks that may be associated with PKOs: *peace observation* - reporting on the disposition of forces within the AO; *internal supervision and assistance* - mandated maintenance of law and order and support to civil authorities; and *monitoring the terms of the protocol* - establishment of buffer zones and cease-fire lines.

¹¹⁶Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: USGPO, September 1993), p. GL-13.

¹¹⁷Joint Pub 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, (Washington, DC: USGPO, April 1994), p. A-1.

The manual lists six tasks which may be associated with PKOs; supervision of free territories, supervision of cease-fires, supervision of withdrawals and disengagements, supervision of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges, supervision of demilitarization and demobilization, and maintenance of law and order. The manual provides a thorough description of the framework for peacekeeping operations and an explanation of the differences between UN and other peacekeeping operations. It is a comprehensive manual which provides the basis for military training, preparation, deployment to, execution and redeployment from peacekeeping operations.

The August 1994 TRADOC PAM 525-1 *Force XXI Operations* is a unique publication. It is not a doctrinal manual, it was developed to provide a coherent concept for "experiments and discovery of needed change, resulting in improved results in both War and Operations Other Than War."¹¹⁸ The manual states that there can be no single authoritative doctrine for the current strategic period and that the principles within the Force XXI concept must be translated into specific scenarios during mission planing. Boundaries within the spectrum of operations will continue to become more blurred, eliminating all-purpose doctrinal templates. The manual assesses OOTW or LIC as the predominant category of military operations that the US military will face over the next few decades.

In December 1994, FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* was published. It provides guidance for the full range of peace operations and addresses the environment, related concepts and principles, and fundamentals, to include planning, operational considerations, training, and supporting functions."¹¹⁹ Peace operations were divided into three categories of activities: Support to Diplomacy which includes Peacemaking, Peace Building, and Preventive Diplomacy; Peacekeeping which includes Observation and Monitoring of Truces and Cease-Fires and the Supervision of Truces; and Peace Enforcement which

¹¹⁸TRADOC PAM 525-5 Force XXI Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: USGPO, August 1994), p. ii.

¹¹⁹FM 100-23 Peace Operations, (Washington, DC: USGPO, December 1994), p. iii.

includes Restoration and Maintenance of Order and Stability, Protection of Humanitarian Assistance, Guarantee and Denial of Movement, Enforcement of Sanctions, Establishment and Supervision of Protected Zones, and the Forcible Separation of Belligerents.

Support to diplomacy is subordinate to the diplomatic peacemaking process and may take place during peacetime or wartime. Peacemaking is a diplomatic process which seeks to end disputes and resolve conflicts which could lead to conflict. Supporting operations include military-military relations, security assistance operations, exercises and peacetime deployments. Peacebuilding is a post- conflict activity. Supporting operations include restoring civil authority, conduct of elections, demobilization of former belligerent parties, and nation assistance. Preventive diplomacy seeks to prevent or limit the extent of a predictable crisis. Supporting operations include preventive deployments, shows of force, and higher levels of readiness to demonstrate US resolve.

Peacekeeping involves military or paramilitary operations undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. Complete neutrality is required for success. Observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires involve individual military personnel which form a group of monitors under the authority of an international agreement. Supporting missions include reporting and monitoring activity, supervision of an agreement, investigations of complaints and violations, negotiations and mediation, and liaison with various parties to the mandate. Supervision of truces involves the deployment of units to fulfill a mandate and permit diplomatic negotiations. Supporting missions include patrolling, establishing movement control points, supervision of the withdrawal of belligerent forces, supervision of demobilization, providing law and order, and humanitarian relief.

Peace enforcement operations include the application or threat of military force, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance in order to restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to a political settlement. Restoration and maintenance of order and stability involves the restoration of order and stability where civil authority is threatened or has ceased to function, or where human rights are endangered. Protection

of humanitarian assistance involves the safeguarding of those providing assistance and relief supplies, which may have to be delivered by the Army. Guarantee and denial of movement involves control of the battle space either to ensure freedom of navigation or to deny movement by belligerent parties. Enforcement of sanctions involves the denial of supplies, diplomatic and trading privileges, and freedom of movement to a sanctioned state. Establishment and supervision of protected zones involves the safeguarding of minorities, refugees, or military forces separated from their main body of troops. Forcible separation of belligerents involves intervention in a conflict against the will of one or more of the belligerents to establish the conditions necessary for peace.

The differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement involve the variables of consent, force, and impartiality. In peacekeeping consent is clear, force is only used in self-defense or defense of the mandate, and the perception of impartiality is required for success. In peace enforcement consent is not absolute, force or the threat of force may be used to coerce or compel, and the perception of impartiality, while desired, is not required for success. (Figure 2)

The principles of peace operations, although revised slightly, are essentially the same as the principles for OOTW in the 1990 FM 100-20. The tenets of Army operations in the 1993 FM 100-5 are revised to describe the characteristics which are fundamental to success. *Versatility* implies the ability to be multifunctional and requires competence in tasks which ensure unit success. *Initiative* implies that the force conducting peace operations controls events by anticipating belligerent actions and using the means available in the mandate to forestall, prevent, or negate their occurrence. *Agility* is the ability to react faster to events than any of the belligerent parties through situational awareness. *Depth* belligerent parties through situational awareness. *Depth* involves a proper campaign plan which coordinates time, space, resources and purpose to affect the environment and conditions required for success. *Synchronization* involves the ability to maximize resources by anticipating the ways in which the belligerents may interact and deploying resources where and when needed.

Variables	Support to Diplomacy	Peacekeeping	Peace Enforcement
Consent	High	High	Low
Force	Low	Low (self-defense/defense of mandate from interference)	Sufficient to compel/coerce
Impartiality	High	High	Low
FM 100-23 <i>Peace Operations</i> , p. 13			

Figure 2. Operational Variables

D. MILITARY LITERATURE

The articles published during this epoch centered on several areas of concern ranging from Desert Shield/Storm, to the effects of the drawdown, to changes in the global strategic situation to doctrinal changes. Relevant articles were discussed within the categories of the UN, Somalia and Rwanda, OOTW, peace operations, and the role of the Army in the post-Cold War world. The process of adjustment to the new domestic and foreign political realities continued. The overwhelming consensus amongst the authors was that although we needed to remain prepared to fight and win the nation's wars, the projected missions of the Army would continue to be dominated by LIC, OOTW, and peace operations.

There were six articles published which related to UN peace operations. The first article described the rapid change in the level of forces that have been involved in UN

peace operations since 1990.¹²⁰ LTC Baker detailed the history of UN peacekeeping and US involvement in multinational peacekeeping and concluded that although the UN has had a relative amount of success conducting peacekeeping, it has not matured into an organization that understands the military subtleties that assist in success. "It is absurd to put troop units from widely disparate armies together under the UN flag and assume they will work side-by-side in harmony."¹²¹ He warned that the US must avoid deploying troops because of the media and must ensure that national interests are at stake. He acknowledged that peace operations were politically desirable for the US and asserted that they may become the primary military mission in the post-Cold war era.

The second article asserted that the UN had forty years of peacekeeping history to draw from and had recently violated every principle articulated by the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations.¹²² John Hillen argued that current Army doctrine contributes to problems within peacekeeping operations because it attempts to link its war fighting doctrine to OOTW and peacekeeping doctrine. UN doctrine has caused problems because of an attempt to link peacekeeping doctrine to more ambitious enforcement actions. To attain success, individual Army professionals must realize the substantive difference between war and peacekeeping, the Army must realize that missions will not always be clearly defined and decisive, and the policymakers must realize that the environment of peacekeeping is not conducive to quick solutions and educate the public. The UN must adapt to the new realities and adhere to the principles developed over forty years of experience.

Three other articles discussed various aspects of role of the US in UN peacekeeping. COL Farris described the mission of UNTAC and declared it was a

¹²⁰Baker, James, "Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations," *Parameters*, Spring 1994, pp. 13-26.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹²²Hillen, John III, "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half," *Parameters*, Spring 1994, pp. 27-37.

successful operation.¹²³ He asserted that the US would continue to be involved in multinational peacekeeping and offered eleven policy implications. MAJ Kearns, USMC, asserted that the US has become the global "911" for emergencies and that US combat troops must remain under US command, with UN authorization, when deployed.¹²⁴ He offered six criteria for involvement and declared that if it was in the US national interest to deploy troops, it should deploy the largest contingent to ensure US command of the operation. Jan Goldman detailed the history of UN peacekeeping operations and believed that the UN could perform a useful role in the dawn of new era and advance US interests.¹²⁵ He argued UN peacekeeping operations are the best avenue towards conflict resolution, but that with a clear mandate from UN members peace enforcement was a viable operation.

Nine articles discussed specific operations; one on *Operation Provide Comfort*, seven on Somalia, and one on Rwanda. LTC Abizaid described *Operation Provide Comfort* and provided insight on recommended training and institutional revisions.¹²⁶ He discussed the challenges of expanding a security zone without resorting to force, the requirement for local intelligence and the development of a "flying checkpoint" to separate the Iraqis and the Kurds. To meet the growing demands on the Army to conduct operations like *Provide Comfort*, he recommended that the study of peacekeeping campaigns be included in doctrinal literature, the CTCs be expanded for peacekeeping

¹²³Farris, Karl, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, A Success," *Parameters*, Spring 1994, pp. 38-50.

¹²⁴Kearns, Darien, "The Need for Criteria in UN Peace Operations," *Military Review*, July 1994, pp. 34-42.

¹²⁵Goldman, Jan, "A Changing World, A Changing UN," *Military Review*, September 1994, pp. 12-18.

¹²⁶Abizaid, John, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," *Military Review*, March 1993, pp. 11-19.

missions, drills for the establishment of checkpoints be standardized, and that US forces performing peacekeeping operations have adequate tactical mobility.

Dennis Steele detailed the deployment of over 20,000 military personnel to Somalia with the mission of creating a safe environment for humanitarian assistance.¹²⁷ The plan was to stabilize the situation and then to disengage combat forces from the "peacemaking mission" and transition into a UN led peacekeeping mission. He noted that the operation was commonly referred to as a peacekeeping operation and that the level of violence appeared to be increasing. The next article written explained how CENTCOM successfully planned, executed, and transitioned from UNITAF to UNISOM II.¹²⁸ MG Freeman, CPT Lambert (USN), and LTC Mims proclaimed that "*Restore Hope* has become the prototype for humanitarian assistance interventions."¹²⁹ However, they noted that long-term tasks and tasks which could offered no measurement of success were eliminated from the mission statement. They stated that additional tasks "which may be essential to long-term security in Somalia" were not part of the CENTCOM mission statement and labeled them "mission creep."¹³⁰

The next article described the actions that led up to the October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger mission which resulted in the death of eighteen soldiers.¹³¹ The article gave an accurate description of the events and described the reinforcements being sent to Somalia. MG Arnold described the operations in Somalia from the deployment of

¹²⁷Steele, Dennis, "Army Units Deploy to Assist Starving, War-Torn Somalia," *Army*, February 1993, pp. 24-28.

¹²⁸Freeman, Waldo; Lambert, Robert & Mims, Jason, "Operation Restore Hope: A US CENTCOM Perspective," *Military Review*, September 1993, pp. 61-72.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, p.72.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹³¹Steele, "Mogadishu, Somalia: The Price Paid," *Army*, November 1993, pp. 25-26.

UNITAF as part of UNISOM I through participation in UNISOM II.¹³² Tactical operations such as air assaults, cordon and searches, patrolling, and military operations in urban terrain were conducted through a modified battlefield operating system (BOS), which added force protection, external coordination, and information dissemination, while dropping air defense because of lack of threat. He offered nine lessons learned from the operation and accurately predicted that the stumbling block for UNISOM II success would be the power of the warlords (article written prior to October).

Walter Clark asserted that the failure in Somalia was caused by the inability to develop a strategic vision which integrated political goals with military missions.¹³³ He assessed the UNITAF operation as a perfectly executed military exercise, but that it was performed without necessary political goals. The failure in Somalia was caused by the inability of the UN to effectively recognize the differences between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations. An expanded mandate without an adjustment to political-military realities within Somalia led to a loss of UN control.

Two articles, written by COL Lorenz, USMC, detailed various legal aspects of the Somalia operation. In the first article, he discussed legal authority, ROE, weapons buy-back programs, weapons confiscation policy, use of deadly force, use of non-lethal force, detention of civilians, women and children as combatants, and the transition to UNISOM II.¹³⁴ He highlighted the need for ROE to be easily understood, the need for a clear policy on weapons confiscation, and better relations with humanitarian relief organizations. In the second article, he discussed the need to develop specialized equipment, training, and

¹³²Arnold, S.L., "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," *Military Review*, December 1993, pp. 26-35.

¹³³Clarke, Walter, "Testing the Worlds Resolve in Somalia," *Parameters*, Winter 1993, pp. 42-58.

¹³⁴Lorenz, F.M., "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," *Parameters*, Winter 1993, pp. 27-41.

ROE for the use of non-lethal force.¹³⁵ He also highlighted the need to plan for the detention of civilians and the development and training of a police force and establishment of a judicial system.

The final article discussed the deployment of troops to Rwanda as part of *Operation Support Hope*.¹³⁶ Up to 4,000 military personnel were deploying to accomplish a humanitarian mission. *Support Hope* was to have five phases: stabilization of the refugee situation, the fostering of stability, a transition to UN control, and the redeployment of US troops and equipment. The affects of the Somalia operation were clear in the assertion that the US forces were not taking part directly in any peacekeeping operation, but were only providing equipment and support capabilities.

Four article discussed OOTW or LIC. The first article examined President Clinton's foreign policy and concluded that the US may be called upon to conduct NEO, civil-military operations, peacekeeping or peace enforcement in Haiti.¹³⁷ COL Mendel examined the situation and offered advice for the conduct of each operation, advising that inter-agency and national coordination were required for success. David Tucker argued that nation assistance was destined to fail because of the economic problems associated with modernization and other cultural factors.¹³⁸ He argued that it was a distraction in LIC doctrine and should be removed to allow a better focus on counterinsurgency.

¹³⁵Lorenz, "Confronting Thievery in Somalia," *Military Review*, August 1994, pp. 46-55.

¹³⁶Steele, "The Mission: Stop the Dying," *Army*, September 1994, p. 15.

¹³⁷Mendel, William, "The Haiti Contingency," *Military Review*, January 1994, pp. 48-57.

¹³⁸Tucker, David, "Facing the Facts: The Failure of Nation Assistance," *Parameters*, Summer 1993, pp. 34-40.

COL Hunter examined the effect of ethnic conflict on two military operations within OOTW, support to counterinsurgency and peace operations.¹³⁹ He noted the recent proliferation of contingency operations that focused on short-term objectives rather than long-term problems, predicting this precedent would hold for the near future. He predicted that all Army forces would be called upon to conduct OOTW and that the category of peace operations needed to be seriously addressed.

The final article on OOTW described the missions of the 10th Mountain Division in Florida (Operation Andrew Relief) and Somalia.¹⁴⁰ MG Arnold and MAJ Stahl discuss the affects of training for warfighting tasks on OOTW and participation in OOTW on warfighting. They conclude that the experience of the division proves that no changes are required in current training doctrine or mission essential tasks. Challenges for the Army included developing parallel planning organizations, force management during deployments, a revitalized strategic lift, developing effective ROE and preparing for operations in areas without a significant infrastructure. They conclude that the current Army doctrine is flexible enough to adapt to any mission.

Three articles discussed peace operations. LTC Eikenberry stressed the importance of peacekeeping operations in conflict containment and the requirement that they be properly planned and executed to safeguard soldiers lives.¹⁴¹ To effectively prepare for peacekeeping operations force structures and roles and missions must be scrutinized, units expected to participate should develop a peacekeeping mission essential task list (METL), CTCs should include PKOs and the use of foreign area officers (FAOs) and observers

¹³⁹Hunter, Horace, "Ethnic Conflicts and Operations Other Than War," *Military Review*, November 1993, pp. 18-24.

¹⁴⁰Arnold, S.L. and Stahl, David, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War," *Parameters*, Winter 1993, pp. 4-26.

¹⁴¹Eikenberry, Karl, "The Challenges of Peacekeeping," *Army*, September 1993, pp. 14-20.

should be increased. He concluded that the Army didn't need to make any abrupt changes to force structure, doctrine, or training, but that some shifts in emphasis were required.

COL Allen, COL Johnson, and COL Nelson assessed the Army's future role in international peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations and discussed the impact on the Army.¹⁴² They believed that the Army would participate in a growing number of peace operations and that doctrine needed immediate attention to standardize definitions and place parameters on the numerous types of peace operations. They recommended that training be standardized and that units be allowed four to six weeks to train under a mobile training team and then rotate through the Carnis peace vignette at the JRTC. They concluded by recommending the Army take the lead in supporting the notion that the best US contribution to peace operations is logistical rather than combat support.

The final article on peace operations discussed the differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement and provided measures of success.¹⁴³ LTC Hunt argued that the Marines in Lebanon were deployed in a manner consistent with peacekeeping in an environment of peace enforcement. A peace enforcement operation requires political representation down to the battalion level to ensure success. The force must be built up rapidly and use of force must be limited to that required to coerce or compel, conducting tactical operations for strategic gain. Measures of success include a negotiations in progress, a reduction or halt in the fighting, and the commitment by the warring factional leaders and their followers to peaceful resolution. Although there is no guarantee of success, the attempt must be considered worth the effort.

The final category of the role of the Army in the post-Cold war is the largest, containing fifteen articles. Two articles argued that a separate force structure was required for peace operations. Regina Gaillard argued that a US Development Corps should be

¹⁴²Allen, William; Johnson, Antione & Nelsen, John II, "Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations," *Military Review*, October 1993, pp. 53-61.

¹⁴³Hunt, John, "Thoughts on Peace Support Operations," *Military Review*, October 1994, pp. 76-85.

formed, with a Civilian Conservation Corps added to the organization, to conduct peacekeeping operations.¹⁴⁴ The new organization would require a new doctrine which exempts LIC and concentrates on humanitarian assistance, civic action and peacekeeping. LTC Demarest argued that a Utility Division should be formed to support the full range of OOTW.¹⁴⁵ The Division would be organized under the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and be deployed as a primary or support package to peace operations. The idea is to provide the Army with a flexible package to provide possible answers to problems in the new era.

Four articles operational discussed aspects of the continuum of military operations. LTC Thurman discussed the continuum of military operations as a means to ensure the proper forces are committed and that a realistic endstate is envisioned.¹⁴⁶ The four major points of the article are that political objectives must be matched to military operations, military capabilities must be developed for nation assistance, CINCs must be able to conduct a myriad of operations simultaneously, and that operations conducted prior to hostilities will assist in achieving the desired endstate during post-conflict activities.

LTC Kingseed asserted that the Army is the best force to accomplish peacetime engagement.¹⁴⁷ As the national security strategy changes, the Army must adapt to new realities. The role of nation assistance should be emphasized as a means to help developing countries and prevent the outbreak of conflict and the requirement to deploy combat forces to quell problems. LTC Rampy discussed the role of the Army in post-

¹⁴⁴Gaillard, Regina, "The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations in," *Military Review*, June 1991, pp. 30-41.

¹⁴⁵Demarest, Geoffrey B., "Beefing Up at the Low End," *Military Review*, June 1993, pp. 50-??.

¹⁴⁶Thurman, Edward, "Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis, and War," *Military Review*, April 1992, pp. 27-35.

¹⁴⁷Kingseed, Cole, "Peacetime Engagement: Devising the Army's Role," *Parameters*, Autumn 1992, pp. 96-102.

conflict activities and the need to develop relevant doctrine.¹⁴⁸ The relationship between political goals, military strategy, and operational planning is focused on the endstate. The challenge is to ensure that when forces are deployed a realistic endstate is envisioned and that all actions are focused on attaining conflict termination.

LTC Rinaldo emphasized that peacetime presence operations are a vital element of the national security strategy of the US.¹⁴⁹ Peacetime operations such as peacekeeping and civil-military operations are perfectly suitable for Army elements. The American people and Congress must realize that short-term solutions do nothing to solve long-term problems and could alienate other countries from the US. Peacekeeping operations are becoming a common mission and will continue to grow in numbers. The Army must shift its emphasis to peacetime activities to effectively support national interests in the post-Cold war.

The final nine articles discussed the role of the Army in the post-Cold war world. General Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, published five articles in an eighteen month span. In April 1993, he stressed the importance on remaining focused on the Army's mission to fight and win wars, but that other missions such as nation assistance, peacekeeping, and peacemaking were becoming more likely missions.¹⁵⁰ He stressed that AirLand Battle doctrine would continue to be the centerpiece of Army doctrine and that the new FM 100-5 *Operations* would soon be published to address new missions.

¹⁴⁸Rampy, Michael, "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities," *Military Review*, October 1992, pp. 42-54.

¹⁴⁹Rinaldo, Richard, "The Army as Part of a Peace Dividend," *Military Review*, February 1993, pp. 45-54.

¹⁵⁰Sullivan, Gordon, "U.S. Army 1993: Power Projected, Contingency Orientated," *Army*, April 1993, pp. 18-25.

In the next article he stressed the changes that would be required within the Army to adapt to the new national security strategy.¹⁵¹ Implications for the Army included the need to redefine regionalism, recognizing that different regions of the world required different types of power projection, and having the ability to rapidly project power in support of US and international interests. A flexible force trained to conduct non-combat missions such as peacekeeping, civic action, and humanitarian relief operations is critical to success. However, the Army must remain committed to successfully executing combat operations when regional problems erupt.

In July 1993, he stressed that raining was the key to success in the new era and that the CTCs were adapting to meet new challenges.¹⁵² The increased likelihood of contingency operations led to the introduction of LIC scenarios at CTCs. A rotation at Hohenfels, Germany of Dutch peacekeepers preparing for their UN rotation to Cambodia was given as an example of the new changes. In October 1993, he stressed that the Army must shift paradigms to meet new realities.¹⁵³ Increased emphasis on peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and counterdrug tasks has resulted in new doctrine and improved training at CTCs which now include journalists, local police, and religious and ethnic factions. The challenge of conducting these operations while continuing to train and prepare for war is being met.

The last article discusses the potential for the Army to assist in the national strategy of enlargement, but warns that an increased involvement could affect warfighting

¹⁵¹Sullivan, "Power Projection and the Challenges of Regionalism," *Parameters*, Summer 1993, pp. 2-15.

¹⁵²Sullivan, "Flexibility Sets the Pace at Training Combat Centers," *Army*, July 1993, pp. 28-35.

¹⁵³Sullivan, "America's Army - Into the 21st Century," *Army*, October 1993, pp. 12-22.

capabilities.¹⁵⁴ The challenges of ethnic conflict, major regional conflict and peace are discussed. Army operations in response to ethnic conflict may include peacekeeping (MFO), preventive deployments (Macedonia) or the imposition of peace (Panama). Army operations in response to major regional conflict focus on the ability to quickly defeat an adversary and establish control over terrain and populations. The challenges of peace require that the Army be able to perform peace support operations, but at a level which does not hinder the ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.

COL Swain discussed the 1993 FM 100-5 *Operations* and advised that the Army needs to do five things to meet new challenges.¹⁵⁵ The Army needs a correct strategic rationale, a concept of supporting military operations, proportional research and development and procurement of equipment, an independent proponent focused on joint operations, and a credible spokesman who can articulate Army requirements as a means of serving national interests. The Army is currently meeting these five requirements, but must ensure that it avoids developing an inward looking mentality and continues to prepare for a fluid world with unexpected challenges.

General Reimer, FORSCOM Commander, discussed the development of a seamless Army which stands ready to meet any challenge.¹⁵⁶ The first peacekeeping rotation at the JRTC involved government, nongovernment, and military agencies to properly train all participants. In January 1995, a rotation to the Sinai would include a mix of active and reserve soldiers. The process of reshaping to meet changes in the global environment must retain the ability to fight and win the nation's wars. General Franks, TRADOC

¹⁵⁴Sullivan & Twomey, Andrew, "The Challenges of Peace," *Parameters*, Autumn 1994, pp. 4-17.

¹⁵⁵Swain, Richard, "Adapting to Change in Times of Peace," *Military Review*, July 1994, pp. 50-58.

¹⁵⁶Reimer, Dennis, "U.S. Army Forces Command Focuses on Readiness," *Army*, October 1994, pp. 47-56.

Commander cited the August 1994, TRADOC PAM 525-5 as the conceptual guide for the future.¹⁵⁷ Although he focused on digitalized battlefields and war, the importance of OOTW and the fact that they were an operational reality was stressed.

The final article discussing the role of the Army described doctrine and the revolution in military affairs.¹⁵⁸ Dr. Jablonsky discussed how peacekeeping fit into doctrine and how the revolution in military affairs affects overall doctrine. UN military operations since the end of the Cold war emerged under the category of peace enforcement, but were still-born because of the inability to capture lessons learned. The Army has adapted well by stressing versatility and agility in the 1993 FM 100-5 *Operations*. The challenge is to retain versatility and flexibility by recognizing the affects of political and social change as well as technological change.

E. SUMMARY

The fourth epoch was characterized by the beginning of a consolidation of doctrine for peace operations and an increase in the political control of US and UN operations. The emergence of a cooperative relationship within the UN led to a dramatic increase in the number of peace operations authorized and the a widely expanded scope within their mandates. New operations included Chapter VII enforcement authority, an increase in the number of operations conducted within, rather than between countries, and large increases in the number of combat forces deployed.

The Bush administration reacted to the successful UN-sponsored operation in the Gulf by pledging to strengthen the ability of the UN to react to crises. He pledged to support UN peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities through greater participation by US troops. The Clinton administration sought to use the UN as a means of conducting

¹⁵⁷Franks, Frederick, "The End of the Beginning," *Army*, October 1994, pp. 59-66.

¹⁵⁸Jablonsky, David, "US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Parameters*, Autumn 1994, pp. 18-36.

assertive multilateralism and initially drafted a directive which would have increased the role of the military in UN operations.

The deaths in Somalia and the growing problems in the former Yugoslavia caused significant revisions within the administration. The revised strategy was issued as PDD 25 and reflected a cautious, but proactive role for the military in peace operations. Although the Clinton administration had not published a national security strategy by the end of 1994, PDD 25 provided a clear message that the military would be expected to execute the full range of peace operations.

US participation in peace operations grew significantly during this epoch. The US participated in UN peace operations and supported UN peace operations through unilateral and multilateral missions that did not fall under UN command. The Somalia operation caused a slight pause in US participation because of the inability of the political leadership to coherently explain the events that led up to the disaster. The US did not participate in the next three UN peace operations and opted to lead the operation in Haiti to preclude US forces from being under UN command. The transition to UNMIH was facilitated by the fact that an American was in charge of the UN military contingent. At the end of 1994 it appeared that the Clinton administration wanted to pursue a national security strategy that included peace operations, but that US forces would not necessarily be under UN command.

Doctrine evolved significantly during this epoch. The 1993 FM 100-5 *Operations* was expanded to include a spectrum of war continuum which explained the range of military operations, the environments, and the goals to be achieved through Army operations. Joint-Publications were developed in an attempt to standardize military operations and improve the ability of the Armed Forces to execute joint-operations. Joint Pub 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations* provided a basis for planning and executing peacekeeping. The 1994 publication of FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* provided the first doctrinal guidance within Army doctrine.

Although its publication was a step forward, it did not provide a comprehensive doctrine for the conduct of peace operations.

The military literature reflected a concerted effort by military leaders to stress the importance of peace operations. General Sullivan published five articles that stressed the requirement that the Army be prepared to execute peace operations. Numerous articles reflected the belief that the Army would execute peace operations and commented on the need for a coherent doctrine. This new reality was also reflected in articles which discussed the expanded range of missions that were being trained at the CTCs. Although most articles predicted that the frequency of peace operations would grow, the requirement to fight and win the nation's wars was usually stressed.

The process of constructing the meaning of peace operations made significant progress during this epoch. PDD 25 clearly articulated the importance of peace operations in the Clinton administration's unpublished national strategy. Senior Army leaders recognized the importance of peace operations and the likelihood that the Army would be called upon to execute these missions. Army participation in peace operations grew dramatically. Doctrine was expanded and the publication of FM 100-23 provided the first doctrinal manual dedicated to peace operations. Military professionals flooded the literature with articles on peace operations.

Progress was made, but the process was far from complete. The Clinton administration published PDD 25, but had not published a national security strategy that provided guidance to the Army. Senior leaders recognized the importance of peace operations, but stressed that the main mission of the Army was to fight and win the nation's wars. Army participation in peace operations expanded dramatically, but the perceived failure in Somalia dampened the experience. Doctrine was expanded to address peace operations, but a comprehensive template was not developed. The military literature contained numerous articles on peace operations, but they were considered by many to be of secondary importance.

VI. CONCLUSION

Peace operations have been accepted as a secondary mission, but have not been institutionalized and continue to challenge the Army. This thesis has traced US Army participation in peace operations from the end of the WW II to 1994. The national security policies of presidential administrations have been examined to determine the role they have played in doctrinal development. Individual operations were examined to determine the changing role of the military in foreign policy and how each mission was conceptualized. Doctrine was examined to determine the doctrinal evolution of peace operations. The military literature was examined to determine how professional military officers viewed the development of peace operations within the military institution.

The national security strategy of the US during the first epoch evolved from the containment of Communism through collective security, to massive retaliation, to flexible response, and ended with the twin policies of detente and rapprochement. A congruence of objectives between the US and the UN served as a catalyst for US involvement in UN peace operations, but was limited to the use of MILOBs. The US participated in two essentially unilateral peace operations in the Dominican Republic and Lebanon. The Army's doctrine was expanded to include stability operations, which included missions which are now considered peace operations. A broad definition of peacekeeping within the government and the Army precluded any progress in the construction of the meaning of peace operations.

The national security strategy of the US during the second epoch evolved from the Nixon doctrine, to Carter's focus on diplomacy and human rights, and ended with Reagan's revised strategy of containment through a revitalized military. The Army responded by developing AirLand Battle doctrine and focusing on the Soviet threat to NATO. The UN was ineffective during this epoch because of the increased tensions between the US and USSR. Multilateral operations in Lebanon and the establishment of the MFO reflected the inability of the UN to function. The deployment of a battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division to the MFO and the operations in Lebanon represented a

commitment to the use of peace operations to achieve foreign policy objectives. LIC doctrine was developed, which included peacekeeping, but was not institutionalized and was not included in FM 100-5. Within military literature, a few officers recognized the need for doctrinal guidance on the conduct of peace operations. The process of constructing the meaning of peace operations began during this epoch, but was hindered by a lack of guidance by political and military leaders and the development of doctrine.

The national security strategy of the US during the third epoch evolved from an assertive unilateral focus to a multilateral approach which included a renewed faith in the abilities of the UN as the Cold War came to an end. The death of 241 Marines in Lebanon was mitigated politically by President Reagan and the Grenada invasion which took place two days later. The US did not participate in the five new UN peace operations, but the establishment of ONUCA in the American sphere of influence represented the Bush administration's confidence in the capabilities of the UN. The Army began to return to a spectrum of conflict paradigm, but stressed the AirLand Battle doctrine was applicable to all levels of conflict. Within the military literature, two consecutive Army Chief's of Staff noted that the likelihood of deploying troops to peace operations was growing. The process of constructing the meaning of peace operations continued during this epoch, but was hindered by a lack of political guidance, the rarity of operations, and definitional problems.

The national security strategy of the US during the fourth epoch evolved from multilateralism to assertive multilateralism under the Clinton administration. PDD 25 was the first comprehensive evaluation of the role of peace operations and served as a means to communicate the administration's desire to use the UN to further US national interests. A cooperative atmosphere within the UN led to an expansion in the number and scope of peace operations. The US contributed Army units to five peace operations under UN command or authority. The deaths of soldiers in Somalia temporarily interrupted US participation, but the successful US-led Haiti operation and transition to UNMIH reinforced the US commitment to peace operations.

Doctrine was expanded significantly to include a Joint Publication dedicated to peacekeeping and FM 100-23 *Peace Operations*. A spectrum of war paradigm was included in FM 100-5 and Joint Pub 3-0 *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, the keystone document for joint doctrine. The military literature reflected the need for the development of a comprehensive doctrine to respond to the changes in the international environment. The scope of change was evident in the articles concerning training for peace operations at the CTCs and the lessons learned from participation in peace operations. However, the Army has not institutionalized peace operations.

The first step in the process of constructing the meaning of peace operations has been met. The political leadership began to stress the importance of peace operations in the latter end of the Reagan administration and reinforced their importance during the Bush administration. The publication of PDD 25 by the Clinton administration clearly articulated the requirement for the military to be prepared to execute peace operations. Although PDD 25 states that the military's primary mission is to fight and win, the need to conduct peace operations is clearly linked to the national security interests of the US.

The second step in the construction of meaning has begun, but has not yet been met. The initial publications on peace operations represents the beginning of doctrinal development. A comprehensive doctrine is the next step which must be met. Campaign planning for peace operations must consider the unique nature of each peace operation. Political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and religious factors must be taken into consideration. Doctrine must address training, force composition, conflict dynamics, mission structures, and the principles and tenets of peace operations. The Army may need to make the conceptual leap from AirLand Battle and develop a separate doctrine for these operations.

The third step in the construction of meaning has also begun, but has also not been met. The Army leadership has accepted the fact that peace operations will be conducted for the foreseeable future. Although they will always be considered a secondary mission, they do not have to be considered of secondary concern. Peace operations bring many of

the risks of actual combat. Many of the frustrations reflected within the military literature are directed at the need for a coherent doctrine. While there is a consensus for the need to execute peace operations, there is also a consensus that appropriate doctrine has not been developed.

Initial steps have been taken in doctrinal development, but the process is incomplete. Peacekeeping doctrine has progressed the furthest and is generally accepted by the Army. Support to diplomacy and peace enforcement continue to challenge the Army and there is a consensus that the appropriate conceptual framework has not been developed within current doctrine. Until a coherent doctrine is developed, peace operations will not be accepted by the Army as an institution.

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